Universitat Jaume I

UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace
International Master of Peace and Development Studies

Thesis:

American Militarism and Alternatives to War:

A Comparative Analysis of Pragmatic and Principled Nonviolence

Eric Stoner

January 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION……..……..…….…...2

CHAPTER ONE: MILITARISM IN THE U.S.……..……3
The Permanent War Economy……..……..…….……..…3
Advertising and Technology…….……...…...…6
Ignorance ……...…….…….....……....7
The Nature of History……..…….…..…….……..8
War Profiteering…….…….……10
Indoctrination……..…….…....…...…….12
The Media……..…….…..…..14
Teaching Powerlessness…….….……18

CHAPTER TWO: PRAGMATIC NONVIOLENCE……..……...…..……....….21
Power: Part I……..…….…....…21
Reasons for Alternative……..……...…...…25
Nonviolent Action……..……....….…….30
Strategy…….…….…...…...…32

CHAPTER THREE: PRINCIPLED NONVIOLENCE.……..……..……..……...37
The Role of Religion…….….….…….38
Man and Human Nature…….…….39
Means & Ends…….……....41
Christian Love..…….…….…….43
Satyagraha……....……....44
Grand Strategy…….....……...…49
Power: Part II…….…….50
Tactics and Methods……..……..……53
Effectiveness…….……..55

CHAPTER FOUR: NONVIOLENCE IN WORLD WAR II…….59
Civilian Resistance……...62
Denmark…….68
Le Chambon……....72
Analysis……...76

CONCLUSION…….81

BIBLIOGRAPHY……..…….……..….……..……...83

INTRODUCTION

However much peace is desired, the unpleasant truth is that we live in an extremely violent world. We are too often confronted with heart-wrenching stories of how violence is devastating homes, neighborhoods and schools across our nation. Unfortunately, while I believe that all violence is connected, this paper will not directly address this serious social problem. It will be for the most part focused on an exploration of certain aspects of violence on the international level. Namely, why is there what seems to be almost universal support for the military in the United States and for its use of violence abroad? Second, is this massive preparation for war necessary or is there a realistic alternative? Are there ways to defend oneself, resist aggression, and confront a military invasion or brutal dictator without using violence that are more humane and effective than violence? And if an alternative does exist - as I will argue there does, in what is commonly referred to as nonviolence - what is it, how does it work, and what are some examples of its effectiveness? Finally to develop a deeper understanding of nonviolence, I have chosen to examine how nonviolence was employed against Hitler and the Nazis during World War II as a case study, knowing that many consider that to be a case where violence was the only option available.

CHAPTER I
MILITARISM IN THE U.S.

To begin this exploration of militarism in the United States, it would be good to first examine the question: Why is there such support for the military with all the exorbitant costs that it entails? Americans spend hundreds of billons of dollars every year on defense without the slightest public debate or being able to point to any clear benefits. Few would probably say that they are safer than those living in Canada or Germany – where defense spending is far lower – or safer than they were ten or twenty years ago. More than likely, many would say they feel less safe today. The different answers to this question that I will explore in this chapter are by no means exhaustive, as books have been written about each cultural or societal factor that I will be addressing in general terms. The answers however are extremely important, because when looked at together they reveal a pervasive culture of violence in the United States and highlight several of the main barriers that exist to deconstructing the war system that is currently so evident in our society, but also present the world throughout.

The Permanent War Economy

The first challenge to dismantling the war system is that the military is so deeply embedded in our culture and society. Far from being programmed by nature, "Modern war has become an institution," concluded the famed ethologist Konrad Lorenz after extensive scientific research on the subject (Nagler, 2001: 270). This institutionalization can be seen in the United States in several ways. First, both the numbers of Americans in the military and working for the defense industry have skyrocketed in the last half-century. As political scientist Chalmers Johnson noted in his recent book *The Sorrows of Empire*, with over 1.4 million citizens now participating in the U.S. military, "It is hard to even remember that on the eve of World War II our regular army was a mere 186,000 men (Johnson, 2004: 188)." President Eisenhower was the first to warn the nation of the influence of a growing defense industry, or what he called the "military industrial complex," that accompanied this growing military force, and the potential negative impact on American society that he foresaw as a

result. In 1961 during his nationally televised farewell speech Eisenhower alerted the nation of a dangerous new development in the "American experience" since the end of the Second World War: that of an "immense military establishment and a large arms industry" which already employed 3.5 million men and women. Twenty five years later, a study done by the Center for Defense Information calculated that that number had nearly doubled, with an estimated 6.5 million people in the U.S. employed by the military services, the Department of Defense, and defense contractors (Fahey & Armstrong, 1992: 64).

The U.S. Congress also played a crucial role in the rise of this massive defense establishment by infusing it every year with enormous sums of taxpayer money. Reflective of the general trend, in 2003 the U.S. Congress proposed to spend over 50 percent of the discretionary budget – which also must fund such important issues as education, transportation, and environmental protection (See Figure 1) – on defense, leaving many other vital programs to fight for the rest. For example, while $382.2 billion was spent on defense in 2003 (not including an additional $62.4 billion received by the Pentagon from the FY2003 supplemental for the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Smith, 2003: 1)), the Department of Education received $50.3 billion, the Department of Health and Human Services $63.6 billion, the Environmental Protection Agency $7.6 billion, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, responsible for subsidizing housing for low-income families, $31.4 billion.

The extent to which this militarism has run rampant in the United States can only be fully appreciated after comparing its defense spending to that of other countries and the world as a whole. The United States, according to the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, has far eclipsed its nearest competitors – China ($51 billion), Russia ($50.8 billion), Japan ($41.4 billion), United Kingdom ($41.3 billion), and France ($34.9 billion) – in defense spending (Hellman, 2004). And in comparison to world military expenditure ($956 billion) in 2003, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's authoritative *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* noted that U.S. spending "accounts for almost half of the world total (Sköns, 2004)."

Not surprisingly, this massive defense establishment with the seemingly endless financial backing of Congress has also led to U.S. dominance of the global arms trade. According to an annual study released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service:

Figure 1.



Source: National Priorities Project

> In 2003, the United States led in arms transfer *agreements worldwide*, making agreements valued at over $14.5 billion (56.7% of all such agreements)… [and] ranked first in the value of all arms *deliveries worldwide*, making over $13.6 billion in such deliveries or 47.5% (Grimmett, 2004: 3).

These factors in combination illustrate how the defense industry has grown to play an extremely important role in the U.S. economy. Some have even argued that America has developed a "permanent war economy," where due to the United States' preference to allocate funds to defense rather than other economic sectors, the U.S. has squandered its historic lead in other markets, such as automobiles, and therefore had to rely even more heavily on defense. Will Hutton, for example, recently wrote in the *Nation* that:

> Beyond the sheltered world of America's defense industrial complex, where fat Pentagon contracts helped create outstanding technological leadership in weapons and the Internet, there is scarcely a high-tech sector where US companies can claim systematic leadership over their European competitors (Hutton, 2003).

As Eisenhower remarked, "Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society." Apart from the 1.4 million citizens in the military and the millions making their livelihoods by working for industries that support our military, there are also millions of living veterans, and millions giving their moral support for the existence and actions of the military. In the United States virtually every family has some personal connection to the military, be it an immediate family member who's "serving" or a relative who fought in one of the many bloody wars of the 20th century. This cultural barrier makes it difficult for anyone to question or criticize the actions of the military - let alone the necessity of the armed forces and our massive preparations for war - because it can so easily be taken personally and would in many people's minds bring into question the livelihood and "sacrifice" of so many Americans.

Advertising & Technology

The second reason for the widespread support of the military and I believe one of the greatest causes of violence in our world today is the fact many people do not make the connection in their minds between their actions and the effects of those actions. Many join the military in the United States without thinking that they are supporting in whatever small way the largest, most well funded killing machine in the world. This is by no means an accident either. They join the military to experience and receive what is advertised – the job skills, the travel, adventure, and importantly for many who would not be able to afford it otherwise, a free ride to college – not looking at the end of their actions. They do not think that they could ultimately be ordered to unquestioningly kill people whom they have never met, or even lose their own lives in the process. Soldiers can now play such a small, sterilized role in the machine that almost all responsibility is lost.

To make matters worse, the technology of war has dangerously developed to a point where a soldier rarely has to see their enemy to kill him, and is in general free from the moral burden that would accompany having to physically see the destruction and suffering caused by his or her actions. "The combatants in modern warfare pitch bombs from 20,000 feet in

the morning, causing untold death and suffering to a civilian population," writes Richard Heckler, "and then eat hamburgers for dinner hundreds of miles away from the drop zone (Grossman, 1995: 99)." Lt. Col. Dave Grossman reaffirms the importance that distance plays in enabling one human to kill another. "From a distance, I can deny your humanity," he writes, "and from a distance, I cannot hear your screams (Grossman, 1995: 102)."

Ignorance

Anatol Rapoport, in his important book *Peace. An Idea Whose Time Has Come,* describes another peculiar aspect of American culture that in itself could be seen as a reason for our entrenched culture of violence and unusually high level of militarism. He writes that:

> ...the United States has been especially favorable for creating an attractive image of the war system, because Americans did not experience modern war on their own soil. In fact, they emerged as unscathed victors in both world wars and these victories were attributed (in the public mind) to the righteousness of the cause and even more to U.S. technological genius (Rapoport, 1992: 86).

This has in turn led to an American population that is by and large ignorant of both the devastating effects of modern warfare and international affairs in general. American cities have never been firebombed or napalmed. Children in the United States do not need to be careful about stepping on a landmine when they go out to play. What average American can tell you about the indiscriminate destructiveness of cluster bombs or dangers of using depleted uranium, both used heavily in the Second Gulf War? Worries about a foreign attack have, until very recently in the "war on terrorism" been the last thing on the mind of most Americans. These luxuries have bred an apathy and ignorance towards international affairs in the U.S. that would be difficult to find in countries that have more directly experienced the horrors of war. As Erasmus, the great humanist from the Renaissance, put it succinctly, "war is sweet only to those who have not tasted it."

While the previous reasons for our current culture of violence are real and significant, there is a fourth factor that I would consider to be the most important and will explore in much greater detail. Most Americans are supportive of war and the maintenance of a massive military apparatus because they have learned of no other alternative to deal with a hostile, aggressive power, or "evil" as the enemy is often described. In fact, all political

leaders know of this ignorance and must use it during the push towards any war. Erasmus illustrated how old and important this truth is when he wrote nearly 500 years ago in the *Complaint of Peace*, that kings often "allege that they are compelled to it; dragged against their will to war (Erasmus, 1974: 34)." Ernest L. Moerk and Faith Pincus came to the same conclusion after conducting a quantitative analysis of war-declaration speeches given by the leaders of the major powers before the outbreak of both world wars. After their thorough study they noted that, "all leaders tried to evoke the impression that they had no choice but to lead their peoples into war (Moerk & Pincus, 2000: 17)."

This was seen once again very clearly during the recent drive to war in Iraq by the Bush administration. On March 17th, 2003, just two days before the start of the war, President Bush in his nationally televised speech emphasized that "should Saddam choose confrontation, the American people can know that *every* measure has been taken to avoid war." He continued by saying, "if we *must* begin this military conflict," as if there were no alternative. According to this speech, it wasn't even Bush's choice to invade and occupy another country. This use of definitive language is crucial, and it only works where ignorance prevails. As long as people believe that every option has been exhausted and know of no alternative to war they can be easily swayed to support violence.

The Nature of History

This ignorance of international affairs and more specifically alternatives to war, while extensive it its reach, is not necessarily inevitable or an accident. Rather, it is both unintentional and intentional in some respects. The first reason is unintentional, and has to do with how history has always been told and made. It also has to do with the very nature of nonviolence. Gandhi explained this point well with his unique and insightful perspective on history. "History, as we know it," he wrote, "is a record of the wars of the world... How kings played, how they became enemies of one another, how they murdered one another, is found accurately recorded in history (Gandhi, 1997: 89)." From the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, Henry Kissinger defined history almost identically as, "the memory of states (Zinn, 1997: 541)." However, Gandhi went a step further. He astutely noted that this is nonetheless merely a perspective and what we have chosen to tell about history, because, "if this were all that had happened in the world, it would have been ended long ago (Gandhi, 1997:89)."

Through his unique lens, Gandhi shed light on why soul-force (or what we could call nonviolence) is not seen in traditional history by stating:

> ...Thousands, indeed tens of thousands, depend for their very existence on a very active working of this force [soul-force]. Little quarrels of millions of families in their lives disappear before the exercise of this force. Hundreds of nations live in peace. History does not and cannot take note of this fact. *History is really a record of every interruption of the even working of this force of love or of the soul* (my emphasis) (Gandhi, 1997: 89-90).

This revolutionary idea turns our common understanding of history on its head. To give a more descriptive example of how history has traditionally been made and why nonviolence can so easily be left out, he continued:

> ...Two brothers quarrel; one of them repents and re-awakens the love that was lying dormant in him; and the two again began to live in peace; nobody takes note of this. But if the two brothers...take up arms or go to law - which is another form of the exhibition of brute force - their doings would be immediately noticed in the press... and would probably go down in history. And what is true of families and communities is true of nations (Gandhi, 1997: 90).

Michael Nagler, founder and chairperson of the University of California at Berkeley's Peace and Conflict Studies Program, has explained how this applies to the international level. "It's difficult to document a war that hasn't happened," he says. "You can document bullets and airplanes, but when someone has a change of heart, you can't document it (Yeung, 2003)."

The nonviolent resistance by the people of Czechoslovakia to the invasion and occupation of their country by half a million Soviet troops during the spring of 1968 provides another example of how overlooked the force of nonviolence has been throughout history (Nagler, 2001). Through their creative use of nonviolence, the Czechs resisted for eight long months an occupation that Soviet military analysts originally predicted would take four days. Professor Nagler, writes of the Czech experience:

> An armed resistance that held off such an overwhelming force for eight months would have passed into folklore – a new Thermopylae, which we remember after two thousand years. But in 1968 there wasn't even a name for the type of resistance the Czech civilians were carrying out, and so we were left with the great irony of Prague Spring – that because an untrained people achieved this resistance for eight months without shedding a drop of blood the world hardly noticed anything was happening (Nagler, 2001: 135).

War Profiteering

While there is this idea that violence is propagated in our society through history rather unconsciously, it would be wrong to say - as Gene Sharp, the godfather of strategic nonviolence, does - that nonviolence is, "largely unknown because historians have been overwhelmingly concerned with other matters (Sharp, 1973: 4)." This is a gross oversimplification and dangerously overlooks an important point. The public's ignorance is also deliberate and a result of conscious planning by active forces in society.

There has and always will be a certain elite that profit off war and conflict at the expense of the people. They profit from 1) the arming and training of our armed forces 2) the arming and training of the militaries, and sometimes the illegal armed actors, in other countries, and 3) the use of our military power to open foreign markets and protect U.S. business interests abroad. Chalmers Johnson calls this last function – the "protector of private capitalist interests" – one of the U.S. military's more traditional and well-established roles (Johnson, 2003: 169). General Smedley Butler, who was the most decorated Marine in U.S. history at the time of his death, spoke of this role very bluntly after his retirement in 1931:

> I spent 33 years in the Marines, most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for Capitalism. I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar

> interests in 1916. In China I helped to see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested (Nader, 2004: 225).

While these military interventions date back many years, their motive – promoting U.S. business interests – explains much more fully all U.S. actions abroad than the story that is commonly told. One would find it hard to argue that the United States has truly been a force for democracy and freedom in the world after a closer examination of history. The U.S. has supported a plethora of dictators and authoritarian regimes – from General Pinochet in Chile and Suharto in Indonesia, to our recent enemies, Saddam Hussein and the Taliban – in recent decades, and overthrown various democratically elected governments. Apologists argue that these are merely regrettable mistakes, but the record is rather consistent. Elections and human rights have meant little as long as the business was good. War has and always will be a tool to benefit a certain elite economically.

The political realist would not necessarily disagree with this assessment. In fact, John Mearsheimer, professor at the University of Chicago and one of the leading proponents of realism, practically said this in a recent interview. On almost every occasion "we act according to the dictates of realpolitik," he said, "but we justify our policies in terms of liberal ideologies (Kreisler, 2002)." Therefore we tell the public that we intervene militarily out of our deep concern over the lack of democracy, human rights or freedom in the country that we are attacking, while the real motives – increasing power – are left unsaid. And wealth and the control of economic resources have traditionally been considered important sources or signs of power.

The public however pays for war with both their taxes and their lives, while those in power risk little personally but reap the rewards. To keep this social arrangement working, they must control, to the extent that they can, what people *think*. They must foster a favorable impression of war by justifying past wars and glorifying the soldier. More importantly, they must never let on to the existence of an alternative. One of the only ways citizens will continue to voluntarily join the military and risk their lives, especially in times of war when combat is expected, is if they truly believe that it is necessary to defend their country or whatever is important to them. This means control of information, which comes in many forms.

Indoctrination

One way to control what has been called the "public mind" is through the education system. According to Noam Chomsky, "the entire school curriculum, from kindergarten through graduate school, will be tolerated only so long as it continues to perform its institutional role." That institutional role he argues, "for the most part is just to train people for obedience and conformity, and to make them controllable and indoctrinated" (Chomsky, 2002: 233). To give an example of how the education system is subservient to the interests of private power, Chomsky analyzes the university:

> Universities do no generate nearly enough funds to support themselves from tuition money alone: they're parasitic institutions that need to be supported from the outside, and that means they're dependent on wealthy alumni, on corporations, and on the government, which are groups with the same basic interests (Chomsky, 2002: 233).

From his own personal experience, Howard Zinn, the well-known radical historian, described the situation at Boston University where he taught as:

> …not too far from the typical, with its panoply of military and government connections – ROTC chapters for every service, former government officials given special faculty posts, the board of trustees dominated by corporate executives, a president eager to curry favor with powerful politicos (Zinn, 1997:571).

This undoubtedly limits intellectual freedom. It is only logical. Why would those in power – be it the military, government, or corporations – want to fund institutions that undermine their interests? One of the interests that these groups all share of course would be perpetuation of the status quo that they are currently benefiting from. Therefore, in political science classes they teach "realism" and Machiavelli, but do not question the military or explore nonviolence as an alternative. Those topics are out of bounds. In fact, despite the common perception of universities being fountains for liberal propaganda, there is a well-

documented history of "ideological repression in academia," particularly against those professors critical of war or capitalism (Parenti, 1995: 177).[1]

An especially important part of the student's curriculum – from grade school through college – for the purpose of indoctrination by those in power is history, because as George Orwell wrote: "Who controls the past controls the future (Zinn, 1997: 479)." This only makes sense, as how one sees history will obviously affect how he or she judges current events and even what decisions are taken for the future. For example, if someone is brought up on history that glorifies the government while downplaying or overlooking entirely its faults, that person would be less inclined to criticize their current government and perhaps more likely to join the military during times of war.

Professor James Loewen did a fascinating study of twelve of the most commonly used history books in American high schools and discovered exactly this. "Textbook analyses," he writes:

> …fail to assess our actions abroad according to either a standard of right or wrong or realpolitik. Instead, textbooks merely assume the government tried to do the right thing. Citizens who embrace the textbook view would presumably support any intervention, armed or otherwise, and any policy, protective of our legitimate national interests or not, because they would be persuaded that all our policies and interventions are on behalf of humanitarian aims. They could never credit our enemies with equal humanity (Loewen, 1995: 229).

To illustrate this point, Loewen surveyed the twelve books to see specifically how they addressed six recent actions taken by the U.S. military or CIA abroad that do not reflect positively on the U.S. government – from the role that the U.S. played in overthrowing the democratically elected governments of Iran (1953) and Chile (1973) to the campaign of sabotage and terror employed against Cuba, including the numerous assassination attempts against Fidel Castro after he took power. His results: half of the twelve books he found left out all six incidents entirely. "Most of the other textbooks pretended," he noted:

---

[1] For a detailed account of this history, from faculty members that were laid off for opposing the U.S. war in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century to the firing of professors in the 1970s and 80s over their political viewpoints and activism, see Michael Parenti's revealing book, *Against Empire*, pg. 175-196.

> …when treating the one or two incidents they include, that our actions were based on humanitarian motives. Thus textbooks portray the United States basically as an idealistic actor, responding generously to other nations' social and economic woes (Loewen, 1995: 227).

A related topic that Loewen addresses is the importance and power that photographs have in conveying a message. After his analysis, he noted that, "no textbook uses *any* photograph of *any* wrongdoing by an American. Indeed, no book includes any photograph of any destruction, even of legitimate targets, caused by our side (Loewen, 1995: 246)." While Loewen gives a number of reasons textbooks are marred by "errors of omission and distortion" – from state adoption boards, to publishing houses, to patriotic authors trying to "build good citizens" – the end result is the same. History textbooks are produced more for the purpose of indoctrination than for honest education.

The Media

In American society the mainstream media play a similar function as the education system, and for similar reasons. As Chomsky writes rather bluntly, the media's "job is to keep people from understanding the world, and to keep them indoctrinated (Chomsky, 2002: 86)." For example, just as poll after poll revealed the true effect of a formal education during the Vietnam War – where, contrary to popular belief, adults with a college education were actually far more inclined to support the war than those with either a high school or grade school education[2] – a study done by researchers from the University of Massachusetts during operation Desert Storm in 1991, found similar results concerning the media's effect on the public (Rampton & Stauber, 2003: 175).

The study revealed that: "The more TV people watched, the less they knew… Despite months of coverage, most people do not know basic facts about the political situation in the Middle East, or about the recent history of US policy towards Iraq." Conversely they found, "a strong correlation between knowledge and opposition to the war. The more people know, in other words, the less likely they were to support the war policy."

[2] For example, a January 1971 national Gallup poll found that twice as high a proportion of college-educated adults (40 percent) were supportive of continuing the war in Vietnam as adults with a grade school education (20 percent). For more details on this poll, see John Loewen's *Lies My Teacher Told Me*, pg. 302-308.

The study concluded, just as media critics would predict given their understanding of the media's role, that: "people who generally watch a lot of television were substantially more likely to 'strongly' support the use of force against Iraq (Rampton & Stauber, 2003:176)." In fact, Richard Hass, a member of the U.S. National Security Council at the time, was quoted in a New York Times article the following November as saying, "Television was our chief tool in selling our policy," referring to the Gulf War (Goodman, 1991: B3).

But this does not explain why the mainstream media so often tow the official line, which indirectly promotes militarism. For that we must examine much more closely the media system in the U.S. Most analysts of the media will concede, as Robert McChesney and John Nichols do, that:

> It is not that the individuals who run these [media] firms are bad people; the problem is that the system of business in America is designed for profit-making, not public interest, and thus we have a media system set up to enrich investors, not serve democracy (McChesney & Nichols, 2002: 53).

In the US a handful of massive, extremely powerful corporations – including Disney, AOL Time Warner, News Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi Universal, Sony, Bertelsmann, AT&T-Comcast, and General Electric – along with roughly a dozen other smaller "second tier" firms, have come to dominate nearly everything that Americans see, read, or hear in the media (McChesney & Nichols, 2002: 48). This is dangerous insofar as these corporations have interests and agendas of their own.

These media giants are intimately linked to both the larger corporate world, that funds them through advertising, and their regulators, the government. Moreover, as McChesney explains, the "wealthy managers and billionaires" that run these firms have, "clear stakes in the outcome of the most fundamental political issues, and their interests are often distinct from the vast majority of humanity (McChesney, 2000: 30)."

However there are others who share the interests of "the owners and managers of dominant media outlets." As the media watch group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) writes, they "generally share the background, worldview and income bracket of political elites." Therefore this structure has led to a system where the media often present: "a picture of the world which defends and inculcates the economic, social, and political

agendas of the privileged groups that dominate the domestic economy, and who therefore also largely control the government (Chomsky, 2002:15)."

Rather than being accomplished by overt censorship or "crude intervention," Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky write that this is normally accomplished by, "the selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors' and working journalists' internalization of priorities and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the institution's policy (Herman & Chomsky, 2002: xi)." These "right-thinking" editors and journalists then paint their picture through, "the way they select topics, distribute their concerns, frame issues, filter information, focus their analyses, through emphasis, tone, and a whole range of other techniques (Chomsky, 2002: 15)."

The billionaire CEO of News Corporation, Rupert Murdoch, provides a perfect example of how personal interests influence media content. His outspoken right wing, pro-war views are clearly seen through the TV stations (e.g. Fox News Channel) and newspapers (e.g. New York Post) that he owns. In fact, "an exhaustive survey of the highest-selling and most influential papers across the world owned by Murdoch's News Corporation," by London's the *Guardian*, revealed that, "none… has dared to croon the anti-war tune. Their master's voice has never been questioned (Greenslade, 2003)." Likewise, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) and others media watchdogs have found similar biases at Fox News, where for example their most recent 25-week study found a "five-to-one conservative-to-progressive imbalance" on the network's flagship news show, Special Report with Brit Hume (Rendall & Hollar, 2004).

The corporate media also promote the interests of those in power, and in turn war and militarism, in other ways. First, they heavily rely on official sources for news, which "gives the news an establishment bias (McChesney & Nichols, 2002: 67)." This was made evident in a detailed study conducted by FAIR before the start of the second Gulf War. In the study FAIR looked at all of the on-camera sources quoted on Iraq over a two-week period – beginning one week before and ending one week after Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation at the U.N. on February 5, 2003 – on ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News and PBS's NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. Noting that this was a "time that saw particularly intense debate about the idea of a war against Iraq on the national and international level," the results of the study were shocking. At a time when

polls showed that the US public was clearly divided on the subject of Iraq,[3] roughly 75 percent of the guests were either current or retired officials, and only 17 percent of all the on-camera sources expressed skeptical or critical positions. These voices included Baghdad officials and those who merely "had concerns about the timing of the Bush administration's war plans." Moreover, of the 16 non-official US skeptics in the news, half were people on the street, and 5 were not even given names. Most surprisingly, only 3 out of the 393 sources, or less then 1 percent, were identified with protests or anti-war groups (FAIR, 2003).

Second, the range of debate is limited by the media, extending, "only as far as does the disagreement of those with a vested interest in limiting the discourse (McChesney & Nichols, 2002: 67)." Therefore:

> Professional journalism is arguably at its worst when the U.S. upper class – the wealthiest 1 or 2 percent of the population, the owners of most of the productive wealth, as well as the top corporate and government officials – is in agreement. In such cases… media will tend to accept the elite position as revealed truth and never subject the notion to questioning (McChesney, 2000: 50).

The classic examples of this, McChesney argues, are how the media cover intelligence, foreign policy, and military operations. Since they are all:

> …conducted primarily to serve the needs of the elite… the extent of the debate on these issues historically has reflected the extent to which the elite itself was split over specific military actions, such as the Vietnam War after 1967 or 1968 (McChesney, 2000: 59).

Numerous cases of journalists having their stories dropped, and being either demoted or fired, for pursuing stories that were too critical of corporate or government power are also evidence of this suppression of dissent. As veteran, award-winning journalist Daniel Schorr once commented, "Attack a government agency like the CIA, or a fortune 500

[3] For example, a CBS poll (2/5-6/03) found that 61 percent of the respondents wanted to "wait and give the United Nations and weapons inspectors more time (FAIR, 2003)."

member like Chiquita, or the conduct of the military in Southeast Asia, and you find yourself in deep trouble, naked, and often alone (McChesney, 2000, 61)."

Many of the problems with the media that have been discussed above, including the intentional limiting of the public debate, were recently made clear in a case involving General Electric. In an effort to appear more well-rounded, GE – both the owner of the television stations NBC, CNBC, and MSNBC, and one of the top ten U.S. defense contractors, receiving $2.8 billion in Department of Defense contracts in 2003 – decided to experiment with a liberal program on MSNBC featuring Phil Donahue. In February 2003, just before the start of the second Gulf War, with Donahue's show actually attracting more viewers than any other program on the network, executives abruptly cancelled the program. A leaked internal NBC report revealed the network's reasoning, saying that Donahue presented, "a difficult public face for NBC in a time of war… He seems to delight in presenting guests who are anti-war, anti-Bush and skeptical of the administration's motives." NBC's ultimate fear was that the show would become, "a home for the liberal anti-war agenda at the same time that our competitors are waving the flag at every opportunity (Rampton & Stauber, 2003: 169)." This presentation of a real alternative to the public – of guests who were actually against the war, or questioned the government's motives – was simply too dangerous, and could not be allowed no matter how high the rating. Donahue's program broke one of the most fundamental rules of the media, and also of history books for that matter: Never question the benevolence of the government or military.

Teaching Powerlessness

The final reason why the media and the education system keep the public in the dark about nonviolence, and consequently supportive of war and the military, is because knowledge of such an alternative would be a direct threat to the status quo and those who currently hold power. In *The Handbook of Nonviolence*, Robert Seeley explained this point succinctly, writing that no:

> ...current government would accept nonviolent defense as national policy - not because such a defense would fail, but because a people trained in nonviolent resistance would be a constant check on government abuses. From the government's point of view, an obedient and disciplined army which follows its leader without question would be far more desirable than a nonviolently trained

> citizenry which can, if it chooses, block government actions it finds unacceptable (Seeley, 2001: 182).

Nonviolence in this sense is a danger to the power of the elite that currently dominate society. Therefore these guardians of the status quo – who as I have described above, have considerable influence over education and the media – have kept the study and knowledge of nonviolence, or what is often referred to as "people power," out of the educational institutions and the press. To the contrary, these mediums teach powerlessness because, as Malcolm X explained: "As long as you are convinced you have never done anything, you can never do anything (Loewen, 1995: 215)."

Professor James Loewen discovered this through his thorough study of American high school history books, writing that they "minimize the potential power of the people and, despite their best patriotic efforts, take a stance that is overtly antidemocratic (Loewen, 1995: 237)." "No book," out of the dozen that he surveyed, "educates students about the dynamics that in a democracy should characterize the interrelationship between the people and their government. Thus no book tells how citizens can and in fact have forced the government to respond to them." For example, advances in civil rights are simply presented as "the result of good government. Federal initiative in itself 'explains' such milestones as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Loewen, 1995: 234)."

The media also play an important role in teaching powerlessness. This can most easily be seen in how the media cover protests, or any other form of nonviolent action. As Chomsky writes:

> …usually political demonstrations get very negative reporting in the United States, no matter what they're for, because they show people they can do things, that they don't just have to be passive and isolated – and you're not supposed to have that lesson, you're supposed to think that you're powerless and can't do anything (Chomsky, 2002: 89).

How the media chose to cover the massive protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999 and against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Washington, D.C. the following year provide the perfect case in point. As McChesney

pointed out, despite being overwhelmingly nonviolent, the media coverage tended to emphasize the property destruction and violence that did occur during the protest (McChesney, 2000: xviii). More to the point, Herman and Chomsky note that news coverage of the events, "almost uniformly failed to deal with the substantive issues that drove the protests," preferring to describe the protesters, "as 'all-purpose agitators' (U.S. News and World Report), 'terminally aggrieved' (Philadelphia Inquirer), simply 'against world trade' (ABC News), and making 'much ado about nothing' (CNN) (Herman & Chomsky, 2002: xliii)."

In summary, militarism has become a dominant feature in American society, as our incredible defense budget and growing reliance economically on the defense industry show. Our personal connections to the military that intimately link us all to war make it that much harder to think rationally about or criticize. While some factors that perpetuate this militarism are unintentional, others are not. The education system and the media are two examples of important opinion-shaping institutions that have, consciously or unconsciously, contributed to this militarism by either marginalizing nonviolence or keeping it unknown altogether. It is my contention that this lack of knowledge of an alternative is the single most important factor that is feeding militarism in the U.S. Therefore, a greater understanding of nonviolence is exactly what we are so desperately in need of. For that reason, the rest of this paper will be dedicated to articulating this alternative to violence, explaining how it works, and showing its incredible potential through several of the most challenging case studies in history.

CHAPTER II
PRAGMATIC NONVIOLENCE

The critique of defense spending and militarism in the United States presented in the first chapter leads inevitably to the question of alternatives. If we don't spend hundreds of billions of dollars on preparing for war every year then how would we defend ourselves in the case of an attack or invasion? However unlikely or unrealistic that may be, it is a valid and important question whose answer will be the focus of this chapter. I will argue that not only is it possible to defend oneself without using violence, as many diverse historical examples illustrate,[4] but that nonviolence is actually the most effective response to violence, be it on the personal or the international level. This is based on the age-old understanding that violence begets violence. Everyone has experienced this at some point in his or her life. For example, when someone shows hostility towards another person, such as insulting, pushing or even hitting, the first and natural response of most people is to insult, push or hit back. This then often creates a spiral of increasingly destructive violence. Martin Luther King Jr. may have explained this phenomenon best in *Strength to Love* when he wrote that, "Returning hate for hate multiplies hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that (King, 1963: 53)."

Power: Part I

A good place to start for an understanding of nonviolence is with an analysis of the notion of power. We are often taught to see violence and power as nearly synonymous terms. Hence the greater violence at one's disposal the more powerful he or she is. To give an example, Kenneth Boulding writes, "If an audience is asked to give a symbolic gesture illustrating the concept of "power," many of them will raise their fists, suggesting threat power or the power to do injury (Boulding, 1990: 16)." This common perception has also been articulated well by numerous other thinkers and politicians. Jonathan Schell, in his recent book *The Unconquerable World*, notes that war and violence have been seen throughout history by rulers and the common citizen alike as the "final arbiter" in international affairs

[4] For a more in depth look at several of these cases, see Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall's *A Force More Powerful* and Gene Sharp's *Waging Nonviolent Conflict*.

(Schell, 2003). German philosopher Hannah Arendt, in her classic study *On Violence*, writes similarly, "that there exists a consensus among political theorists from Left to Right to the effect that violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power (Arendt, 1970: 35)." This explains, at least in part, why neither major political party in the United States dares to question spending on defense. The violence and military might of the U.S. is clearly unrivaled in the world today, and our leaders – seeing that as the ultimate symbol of power – are striving to keep it that way indefinitely. [5]

Arendt continues by quoting C. Wright Mills as saying that, "All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence (Arendt, 1970: 35)." Mao Zedong was another believer in this relationship, saying famously that, "power grows out of the barrel of a gun (Arendt, 1970: 11)." If one accepts this explanation of power, then the only way to defeat violence is through the use of greater violence. This can tragically be seen throughout history, most graphically perhaps in how the Second World War came to an end.

However, a closer look at history reveals serious flaws in this common understanding of violence and its relation to power. For example, there are numerous cases throughout the 20th century (i.e. Chile under Pinochet, the Philippines under Marcos, South Africa under apartheid, and most recently Milosevic in Serbia) of unarmed people toppling dictators and extremely repressive regimes that clearly controlled the use of force with little or no violence. These successful nonviolent struggles simply cannot be explained by someone who sees violence as the ultimate manifestation of power. The dictators should have been able to easily crush their opponents to safeguard their power. At this point cognitive dissonance usually kicks in and they are written off as merely exceptions to the rule. But as Sharp notes, these cases have:

> …occurred in widely differing cultures, periods of history, and political conditions. It has occurred in the West and the East. Nonviolent action has occurred in industrialized and nonindustrialized countries. It has been practiced under

[5] While repeatedly noting the "unparalleled strength" of the U.S. armed forces, the most recent *National Security Strategy of the United States,* published in September 2002 by the White House, went as far as to state that our military should be so strong that any potential adversary will be dissuaded from even thinking about building up their military "in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." See http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf for the full text.

> constitutional democracies and against empires, foreign occupations, and dictatorial systems (Sharp, 2005: 15).

Given these diverse historical cases then, proponents of nonviolence have developed a radically different understanding of what power is. Power, according to Hannah Arendt:

> …is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with…disappears, "his power" also vanishes (Arendt, 1970: 44).

While this is perhaps most obvious in a democracy, where those "in power" are clearly empowered by the citizens who voted for them to represent their interests, it is true for any form of government. Even authoritarian regimes and dictators rely on the support of a multitude of actors for their power - from the military and police forces, to those who run the bureaucracy and keep the communication and transportation systems functioning on a daily basis.

Arendt even argues that power and violence have an inverse relationship, stating that, "it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where one rules absolutely, the other is absent (Arendt, 1970: 56)." Thus, violence enters the picture only "where power is in jeopardy (Arendt, 1970: 56)." It is not however without use, she contends. Violence can at times be substituted for power to bring victory, "but the price is very high; for it is not only paid by the vanquished, it is also paid by the victor in terms of his own power (Arendt, 1970: 53)." Surprisingly, even the godfather of realism agrees. In his *Discourses*, speaking of the prince, Machiavelli writes that, "the greater his cruelty, the weaker does his regime become (Sharp, 1973:51)." Gene Sharp has called this "political jiu-jitsu." "In this process," he writes, "brutal repression against disciplined nonviolent resisters does not strengthen the opponents and weaken the resister, but the opposite happens (Sharp, 2005: 47)."

Another understanding of power suggests that violence is not necessarily the opposite of power, but that it is only one of many forms of power. Schell, for example, sees two general types of power.

> Power that is based on support might be called cooperative power… [and] power based on force might be called coercive power… Both kinds of power are real. Both make things happen…Yet the two are antithetical. To the extent that one exists, the other is ruled out (Schell, 2003: 227).

Gene Sharp, the leading advocate of strategic nonviolence, writes at great length about the nature of power. In his most recent book *Waging Nonviolent Conflict*, Sharp shares a view of power similar to Arendt's, stating that, "the power of rulers and of hierarchical systems, no matter how dictatorial, depends directly on the obedience and cooperation of the population (Sharp, 2005: 39)." Sharp would agree with David Hume, who saw the people as "the source of all power (Burrowes, 1996: 85)." Robert Burrowes summarizes Sharp's argument well, stating that power therefore is not intrinsic to political elites. It is naturally based on external sources. The sources of power that Sharp identifies:

> …include authority (the acceptance by the people of the elite's right to command), human resources (the elite's supporters, with their knowledge and skills), intangible factors (such as psychological considerations and ideological conditioning), material resources, and the type and extent of sanctions at the elite's disposal (Burrowes, 1996: 85).

Therefore, if the sources of power are external, how much power any ruler possesses, no matter how despotic, depends on how much power that society is willing to grant him (Sharp, 2005: 29). A broad array of political thinkers throughout history have understood this, from the Founding Fathers of the United States to ruthless tyrants, such as Adolf Hitler, who wrote in *Mein Kampf* that "in the long run, government systems are not held together by the pressure of force, but rather by the belief in the quality and the truthfulness with which they represent and promote the interests of the people (Sharp, 1973: 29)." Even in violent conflict between states the central importance of opinion is noted, as military

strategists often stress winning the "hearts and minds" of the opponent as a critical component for success in war.

Reasons for Alternative

With this alternative conception of power as its base, people have developed ways in which they can successfully resist aggression from their own government, or from a foreign adversary, without violence. Two main schools of thought on this subject have emerged. The first I will refer to as pragmatic nonviolence, because its proponents do not advocate its use based on any religious belief or moral reasoning that prohibits the use of violence, but because they believe that it is the most effective means for people to resist in most cases. They promote the use of nonviolent sanctions, as some writers prefer to call them, based on the belief that they "can end oppression and liberate nations and peoples, and they can do so with less risk and more certainty than resorting to violent revolt or terror (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 8)."

The pragmatic reasons for their promotion of nonviolence are several. First, it is believed that violence works on a fairly simple premise and that it is not usually employed without purpose. As Jack DuVall explained recently in *Sojourners Magazine*, "The logic is this: Those who threaten violence want something from those being threatened. That's a transaction, and each party to a transaction has leverage (DuVall, 2004: 20)." Moreover, violence, or the threat of violence, fundamentally rests on fear to work. Therefore once fear is overcome – which is a prerequisite for a people seeking to use nonviolent action effectively – violence will no longer have its intended effect, and a Pandora's box of possibilities is opened.

Second, governments usually control the means of violence. Hence if the resisters were to choose violence they would be choosing to confront the opponent with his weapon of choice, inevitably giving him the advantage. Nonviolent resisters have their own preferred "weapons." Gandhi openly acknowledged this, writing in 1909 to the British: "You have great military resources. Your naval power is matchless. If we wanted to fight with you on your ground, we should be unable to do so…(Gandhi, 1997: 114)." However he did not despair, but rather went on to elaborate how Indians could and eventually would wrest control of the jewel of the British Empire from the Brits and gain their freedom under his leadership, writing:

> …but if the above submissions be not acceptable to you, we cease to play the part of the ruled. You may, if you like, cut us to pieces. You may shatter us at the cannon's mouth. If you act contrary to our will, we shall not help you; and without our help, we know that you cannot move one step forward (Gandhi, 1997: 114).

Third, it is argued that the casualties and destruction resulting from violence are often far greater than when nonviolence is used, and that "almost without exception, in nonviolent conflicts the cost – in lives, injuries, and destruction – is not paid by nonparticipants but by those who are waging the struggle (Sharp, 2005: 384)." This is due to 1) the spiraling effect of violence, 2) the recognition that, "there is within most men an intense resistance to killing their fellow man," in the words of psychologist and former U.S. Army Ranger, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, and 3) a belief that responding to an aggressor nonviolently counteracts several of the key justifications that are used in killing (Grossman, 1995: 4). This argument is based on the results of extensive psychological research, and supported by military and civilian studies that look at the behavior of soldiers in combat and how combat affects those taking part in it.

For example, U.S. Army Brigadier General, S.L.A. Marshall, who also became the official U.S. historian of the European theater of operations for the Second World War, conducted a study during World War II in which thousands of soldiers from more than four hundred infantry companies who faced close combat with enemy troops were asked how they acted in battle. To his surprise, he found that only 15 to 20 percent were able to fire their weapons at the enemy (Grossman, 1995: 3-4). Moreover, "There is ample supporting evidence to indicate that Marshall's observations are applicable not only to U.S. soldiers or even to the soldiers on all sides in World War II," Grossman concludes further in his thorough and fascinating study, *On Killing*. "Indeed, there are compelling data that indicate that this singular lack of enthusiasm for killing one's fellow man has existed throughout military history (Grossman, 1995: 16)." Another World War II study undertaken by Swank and Marchand (1946) also reveals vividly how truly contrary to human nature killing is. To summarize, they found that "War is an environment that will psychologically debilitate 98 percent of all who participate in it for any length of time. And the 2 percent who are not driven insane by war appear to have already been insane – aggressive psychopaths – before coming to the battlefield (Grossman, 1995: 50)."

Given these findings, the questions that must be asked are: how does the military get soldiers to kill, what factors in conflict enable killing, and how would the use of nonviolence affect those factors? Grossman indicates numerous factors that influence the willingness of an individual to kill, and explains in detail the importance of each. These factors include the demands of authority (and its proximity), group absolution, the predisposition (i.e. the training/conditioning, recent experience, and temperament) of the killer, the physical and emotional distance from the victim, and the target attractiveness of the victim (Grossman, 1995: 142). Despite this multitude of factors, Grossman writes that, "The most obvious motive for killing in combat is the kill-or-be-killed circumstances of self-defense or the defense of one's friends," with the latter being cited throughout the voluminous research on the subject as the primary factor (Grossman, 1995: 149, 173). These findings give even greater weight to an argument for nonviolence, because confronting the opponent without threatening or using violence effectively removes two of the most powerful justifications for killing in conflict.

To illustrate this point, historical comparisons are often made between cases where violence and nonviolence was used in conflict. "For example," Australian nonviolence expert, Robert Burrowes, writes:

> …during their war of independence against the French, Algerians suffered nearly one million deaths (out of a population of just ten million). Similarly, and despite the frequent and naïve claim that it was the British moral code that made Gandhian nonviolence possible in India, during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, the British killed 11,503 Kenyans (out of a resistance movement that numbered little more than 100,000) in a three year campaign notable for its atrocities in the field and its systematic use of sadistic torture in the fifty-five concentration camps set up to 'detain' Mau Mau suspects and prisoners (Burrowes, 1996: 239).

This is in marked contrast to Gandhi's struggle for independence in India, where over thirty years, not one British soldier was killed, according to Richard Gregg, and the people of India "suffered only eight thousand deaths (out of a population of 350 million). Similarly, the nonviolent struggle that liberated Zambia from British rule was 'virtually bloodless' (Burrowes, 1996: 239)."

Fifth, violence by its very nature "usually excludes some people from participation because of age, sex, physical condition, beliefs, or distaste (Sharp, 2005: 425)." As Jack DuVall explained at a talk on nonviolence that I attended in Washington, D.C., this fact often allows a very small group, whose leaders are chosen through coercion, to claim responsibility if the violence proves successful. This inevitably paves the way for a more authoritarian, violent successor government. In fact, "it has been widely recognized that violent revolutions and wars have been accompanied and followed by a tendency toward an increase in both the absolute power of the State and the relative centralization of power in its hands (Sharp, 2005: 427)."

Nonviolence on the other hand allows for all sectors of society to participate in the struggle and encourages it. No matter the age or gender or class, there are creative nonviolent ways for every person to resist. To give just a few examples, the poor and women can strike and refuse to work. The elderly can participate in consumer boycotts, withhold taxes, and do symbolic acts of protest. Children can be involved through participation in vigils and demonstrations. Gandhi noted that, "even a man weak in body is capable of offering this resistance… Control over mind is alone necessary, and when that is attained, man is free like the king of the forest, and his very glance withers the enemy (Gandhi, 1997: 94)." An example of an act of protest in which all the different sectors of society took part happened in Chile at eight o'clock in the evening on May 11, 1983. In response to a call for a National Protest Day against the military dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, people throughout the capital of Santiago began beating on their pots and pans out their windows as a symbolic act of resistance and solidarity. That seemingly simple act proved to be extremely powerful, and according to one Chilean political leader, was "the birth of a massive, popular movement against the military regime (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 279-280)."

The possibilities are truly endless, and the benefits are several fold. First, on a strategic level, "it distributes resistance to all parts of civil society, vastly complicating the requirements in manpower and material for the opponent to maintain power (Crist, 2002: 7)." It gives greater legitimacy to the cause and makes the movement even more powerful, because the opponent can see that a broad swath of society is arrayed against it, rather than just a small segment, such as the students. Third, the whole society can feel empowered and take credit for making change because they all took part. And moreover, the leaders of

nonviolent movements are generally chosen by the people based on their abilities. This by its very nature lays the foundation for greater power sharing and for democratic government. Nonviolent struggle, due to this inclusiveness, is in itself an expression of the popular will and an exercise in democracy.

Sixth, there are several other negative consequences of using violence versus nonviolence. Violent resistance does not tend to generate feelings of sympathy amongst the people within opponent's group, but in many cases seems to justify extreme repression (Sharp, 2005: 408). This is one explanation for why the opponents of a nonviolent resistance will often times try to instigate violence. As one participant at a recent conference on nonviolence put it, "Dictators prefer movements to use violence because it allows them to repress with some legitimacy (Crist, 2002: 8)."

Violence tends to create greater feelings of solidarity and unity within the opponent group. This adverse effect of violence has even been proven in large scale conflicts, such as World War II, where according to Dave Grossman, massive aerial bombings of cities were "surprisingly counterproductive in breaking the enemy's will (Grossman, 1995: 80)." "Indeed," he writes, "bombings seemed to have served primarily to harden the hearts and empower the killing ability of those who endured it (Grossman, 1995: 56)." Even the U.S. military came to this conclusion, as a post-World War II U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey revealed, in the words of Paul Fussell, "that 'German military and industrial production seemed to increase – just like civilian determination not to surrender – the more bombs were dropped' (Grossman, 1995: 80)."

On the other hand, "extreme repression against nonviolent resisters is more likely to create opposition…[and] may be perceived as unreasonable, distasteful, inhumane, or harmful to the opponent's own society (Sharp, 2005: 408)." Moreover, "the use of violence against people who have declared their commitment to nonviolence is clearly seen to violate major norms of international behavior," Robert Burrowes asserts, "as the widespread outrage over the Beijing massacre in 1989, the Dili massacre in 1991, and the Bangkok massacre in 1992 illustrated (Burrowes, 1996: 180)." This point is also illustrated well through the comparison of British actions in India and Kenya. As Sharp notes:

> The British populace mostly did not protest against harsh repression of the Mau Mau violent resisters in Kenya during British rule in the 1950s… [Whereas] the Indian

> choice to use nonviolent struggle instead of violence greatly facilitated protests in Britain against harsh repression (Sharp, 2005: 409).

Another point that is often raised concerning the use of violence is that it serves as a distraction by shifting the attention of the media and the people within the opponent's group away from the issues at hand to the violence itself, thus hurting the cause and the resistance (Sharp, 2005: 390, Weber, 2001: 496). During the struggle for civil rights, Martin Luther King Jr. stressed this point over and over again, arguing that nonviolence "dramatized the essential meaning of the conflict and…made clear who was the evildoer and who was the undeserving victim," in a way that violence never could (King, 1967: 5). "Violence," he believed, "even in self-defense, creates more problems than it solves (King, 1986: 130)."

Nonviolent Action

So what exactly is this alternative? Its main proponent, Gene Sharp, prefers to call it nonviolent action or nonviolent struggle. "Nonviolent action," he writes in his classic *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, "is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the matching of forces and the waging of 'battles,' requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its 'soldiers' courage, discipline, and sacrifice (Sharp, 1973: 67)." As Ackerman and DuVall explain in *Sojourners* magazine, "Strategic nonviolent action is not about being nice to your oppressor, much less having to rely on his niceness (Ackerman & DuVall, 2002: 23)." They argue that the purpose of nonviolent resistance, as is often the case with the use of violence as well, is fundamentally to take power. Using the new understanding of power elaborated above, proponents of nonviolent action believe that this can and has been done throughout history by ordinary people through the withdrawal of their consent (Sharp, 1973: 4). Although they might not publicly acknowledge it, even those "in power" intuitively understand that the people have this ability, argues syndicated columnist Sean Gonsalves. "Why do you think politicians are obsessed with public opinion?" he astutely asks. "Because they know, no matter how powerful an individual they are, without constituent support they can't rule over anyone (Gonsalves, 2005)." Therefore, seeing political power as fragile and in a constant state of flux:

> …nonviolent action is based on a very simple postulate: people do not always do what they are told to do, and sometimes they do things which have been forbidden

> to them. Subjects may disobey laws they reject. Workers may halt work, which may paralyze the economy. The bureaucracy may refuse to carry out instructions. Soldiers and police may become lax in inflicting repression; they may even mutiny (Sharp, 1973: 63).

"When all these events happen simultaneously," Sharp argues:

> …the man who has been "ruler" becomes just another man…Yet the ruler's military equipment may remain intact, his soldiers uninjured, his cities unscathed, the factories and transport systems in full operational capacity, and the government buildings undamaged. But everything is changed. The human assistance which created and supported the regime's political power has been withdrawn. Therefore, its power has disintegrated (Sharp, 1973: 63-64).

Gandhi at times put it similarly, writing in 1920 for his publication *Young India*:

> I believe, and everybody must grant, that no Government can exist for a single moment without the cooperation of the people, willing or forced, and if people withdraw their cooperation in every detail, the Government will come to a standstill (Gandhi, 2001: 157).

The various "weapons" in the nonviolent resister's arsenal Sharp classifies in several ways. First, they are either acts of omission or commission - that is not doing something that is expected or required, or doing something that is not expected or illegal. Second, these acts are categorized into three broad classes of methods: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention (Sharp, 2005: 19). These methods, of which Sharp has identified at least 198, include everything from petitions, demonstrations and vigils, to more aggressive actions, such as economic boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, civil disobedience, nonviolent raids or occupations, and the creation of parallel government.

Some proponents of pragmatic nonviolence even argue that acts of nonviolent sabotage, such as stealing the opponents weapons, tampering with the computer systems that control their means of repression, or even spiking the treads of tanks to render them

inoperative, are legitimate and essentially a form of economic sanction (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994: 39-40).[6] These acts are defined as nonviolent by these authors because they are methods which one can use to conduct a conflict and seek objectives without recourse to killing or "causing direct physical injury to the opponents or their agents (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994: 4)."

Unfortunately, all of these methods have generally been employed spontaneously with little or no planning behind their use. Often absent as well from nonviolent struggles is any historical knowledge of the technique and its successes by those participating in nonviolent resistance, which leads to groups inevitably repeating mistakes that others have made before them. One experienced American activist, Dave Dellinger, went so far as to say that:

> The theory and practice of active nonviolence are roughly at the stage of development today as those of electricity in the early days of Marconi and Edison. A new source of power has been discovered and crudely utilized in certain specialized situations… [but] the potential uses of nonviolent power are… as yet virtually unrealized (Truth Force Training Center).

This actually makes the nonviolent successes in Chile, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa and Serbia in recent years that much more incredible. The goal then for advocates of pragmatic nonviolence is to increase the effectiveness of nonviolent action through greater knowledge, planning and strategy.

Strategy

Strategy in nonviolent struggles is just as crucial to success as good strategy and implementation are for success in conventional warfare. Similarly, while success can never be guaranteed, and no single strategy can serve as a blueprint for success in all military wars or nonviolent conflicts, several basic strategic principles have been elaborated by theorists of pragmatic nonviolence.

---

[6] Ackerman and Kruegler consider these acts to be economic sanctions essentially because they render the material resources of the opponent inoperative. It should be noted here that Gene Sharp argues vehemently against the use of sabotage. For a detailed explanation of his reasoning, see *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, pgs. 390-91.

The first step for those planning to launch a nonviolent struggle, according to Sharp, is the preparation of a "strategic estimate." This requires that the strategists identify and analyze numerous aspects of the conflict situation – including "geographic, climatic, governmental, military, cultural, social, political, psychological, economic, and international factors" – in order to develop a deep understanding of the context of the conflict before it is initiated (Sharp, 2005: 448-449). [7]

After that is completed, the nonviolent resisters can focus on the strategy itself. Ideally, the nonviolent group will begin by developing a "grand strategy." Sharp calls this the "master concept for the conduct of the conflict," that "serves to coordinate and direct all appropriate and available resources… of the population or group to attain its objectives in a conflict. It… makes it possible to anticipate how the struggle as a whole should proceed (Sharp, 2005: 455)." At this point many important decisions that will have a bearing on the entire conflict will be made. First, the group must develop a clear set of agreed-upon goals. An important part of this decision should include how the strategists envision the conflict developing and eventually ending, and which mechanism of change is most applicable to their situation.

Sharp "distinguishes four broad processes, or mechanisms, that can bring success: Conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration (Sharp, 2005:415)." Conversion essentially takes place when the opponent has a change of heart or opinion and is persuaded that the cause that the nonviolent group is fighting for is just. Through conversion, a conflict that once seemed to be a "zero-sum conflict" is transformed into a "win-win" situation. Proponents of pragmatic nonviolence are always quick to add here that this rarely happens. More common is accommodation, where the opponent comes to an agreement with the resisters because it is "preferable to a continued exchange of sanctions (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994: 50)." Nonviolent coercion, on the other hand, takes place when "shifts of social forces and power relationships produce the changes sought by the resisters against the will of the opponents, while the opponents still remain in their existing positions (Sharp, 2005: 418)." In fact, as Ackerman and Kruegler note, through coercion the very ability of the opponent to continue fighting is negated (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994: 50). Finally, disintegration – while given a category of its own – is merely an extreme form

[7] For detailed information on how to prepare a strategic estimate, see the Appendix A in Gene Sharp's *Waging Nonviolent Conflict*, pg. 525-541.

of coercion that leads to the opponent's regime or group falling completely apart (Sharp, 2005: 419).

It is important at the "grand strategy" level to consider the desired mechanism of change, because if the goal in a conflict is conversion then the strategy will be far different from a situation where resisters are seeking to coerce a brutal dictator to step down or to disintegrate his regime entirely.[8] If the goal is accommodation, nonviolent coercion or disintegration, then according to Robert Burrowes, the nonviolent resisters are essentially seeking "to defeat the opponent and, if this entails any suffering (short of physical injury), to inflict that suffering on the opponent (Burrowes, 1996: 99)." To "defeat their opponent," resisters must fundamentally alter the power relationship in their favor. Attention therefore should be focused on:

> …identifying the opponents' sources of power, and the institutions that serve as 'pillars of support' for the opponents by providing these sources of power. Pillars of support are the institutions and sectors of society that supply a regime (or any other group that exercises power) with the needed sources of power to maintain and expand its power capacity (Sharp, 2005: 451).

Each pillar of support corresponds to one of the sources of power described earlier in this chapter. As Sharp explains, examples of these pillars:

> …include moral and religious leaders supplying authority and legitimacy; labor, business, and investment groups supplying economic and material resources; civil servants, administrators, bureaucrats, and technicians providing human resources and special skills; and police, prisons and military forces providing the ability to apply sanctions (including repression) against the population (Sharp, 2005: 451).

[8] Sharp and other pragmatic theorists typically make a distinction between these mechanisms. They argue that conversion may be possible in less serious conflicts, but that in more acute conflicts, where people are struggling against a dictatorship, or where fundamental, non-negotiable issues are at stake, some form of coercion will likely be necessary. Sharp calls conversion "unrealistic" and "naïve" in these cases (Sharp, 2005: 480).

Once these pillars are identified, the key is "to target the vulnerable sources of power of the opponent by concentrating strength against their weakest pillars of support (Sharp, 2005: 483)." Every regime, no matter how invincible it appears, has its vulnerabilities. For the nonviolent resisters, it is just a matter of discovering what those are through careful analysis.

Most nonviolent struggles will not be won through simply one campaign or the use of one method. More often than not, there are numerous campaigns within the grand strategy that each requires a strategy of its own. As Sharp notes, to achieve their objective(s) nonviolent resisters will usually devise a plan that consists of "a phased series of campaigns and other organized activities designed to strengthen the aggrieved population and society and to weaken the opponents (Sharp, 2005: 448)." This type of phasing in a conflict can have several important benefits for those involved. These phased campaigns, Sharp writes:

> …can give the population experience in applying nonviolent struggle. If planned and conducted skillfully, this option can bring a series of successes to the resisting population. These may increase their skills in conducting this type of struggle, give experience in strategic planning, and increase the self-confidence of the population and the resisters (Sharp, 2005: 477).

Campaigns may also be phased so that a different sector of the resisting society takes up the "brunt of the struggle" for a certain period of time, thus allowing other "segments of the population to rest while resistance continues (Sharp, 1993: 53)."[9] The civil rights struggle in the United States, led my Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., is one of the most clear examples of a nonviolent conflict with phased campaigns. Since racial discrimination was so entrenched in the United States, a single campaign was not going to be sufficient for their objectives. Therefore individual campaigns were launched throughout the 1950s and 1960s "against specific practices of discrimination, such as segregated buses and lunch counter service, employment discrimination, and voting restrictions (Sharp, 2005: 475)."

[9] "For example," Sharp writes, "students might conduct strikes on an educational issue, religious leaders and believers might concentrate on a freedom of religion issue, rail workers might meticulously obey safety regulations so as to slow down the rail transport system, journalists might challenge censorship by publishing papers with blank spaces in which prohibited articles would have appeared, or police might repeatedly fail to locate and arrest wanted members of the democratic opposition (Sharp, 1993: 53)."

Only at this point, once the strategic estimate, the grand strategy and the individual campaign strategy have been developed is it recommended that the strategists choose which tactics and specific methods will be used (Sharp, 2005: 459-460). In most cases, especially during struggles that will likely take a long time, the resisters will need to employ numerous methods throughout the duration of the conflict. For example, nonviolent resisters in the civil rights movement in the United States used demonstrations, marches, picketing, "freedom rides," sit-ins, strikes, and boycotts, to name a few, during their long struggle for equality.

In cases where greater repression is expected, it is often wise at first to use milder methods that entail less risk to the participants. For example, a large street demonstration under a dictatorship might unnecessarily risk massive casualties by providing an easy target for the military or police forces, whereas a symbolic act of protest – such as the banging of pots and pans in Chile that I mentioned earlier – or a stay at home strike may be just as powerful but far more difficult to repress. The boycott of British cotton in India – which at its height, between October 1930 and April 1931, reduced British imports by 84 percent – is another example of nonviolent resistance that proved to be very effective without providing an easy target for repression (Sharp, 1979: 10). Doing this risks fewer casualties, allows for greater participation, and builds the self-confidence among the resisters that will be needed later in the conflict for more aggressive and challenging acts of noncooperation.

It is through this process that theorists of pragmatic nonviolence argue that nonviolent action will work best. According to this school of thought, the numerous nonviolent sanctions, articulated well by Sharp, should be carried out "to constrain or punish opponents and win concessions (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 2)." The strategy of nonviolent resisters, they assert, should take advantage of the opponent's vulnerabilities, create costs for the opponent whenever possible, and inevitably restrict or sever their sources of power. "The net effect of a well-planned attack on the opponents' strategy for control," argue Ackerman and Kruegler, "should be severe disorientation and frustration (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994: 37)." While there are many similarities between the two schools of thought on nonviolence, as we will see in the next chapter, there are also many differences.

CHAPTER III
PRINCIPLED NONVIOLENCE

The second school of thought is often referred to as principled nonviolence. Proponents of this type of nonviolence generally believe that all of the negative qualities of violence and positive attributes of nonviolence that I elaborated on in the previous chapter are true. However, they are not the reasons why the proponent of principled nonviolence chooses nonviolence. Rather, they are seen as the natural positive effects and benefits of nonviolence. In fact, it may even be misleading to say that they "choose" nonviolence at all. It is essentially the only way for them to act, and the only way that they envision true peace ever being achieved. As Martin Luther King Jr. famously concluded after pondering the advent of the nuclear bomb and the incredible destructiveness of modern warfare: "The choice today is no longer between violence and nonviolence. It is either nonviolence or nonexistence (King, 1986: 61)."

Practitioners of this "principled" nonviolence believe in it not because they see it as the most effective form of action given the circumstances – even though they do – but because they believe that all violence is morally or ethically wrong. Thomas Merton, the well-known Trappist monk, gave voice to this principled mindset in 1968 when he wrote in one of his last writings on peace before his untimely death, that: "Nonviolence is not for power but for truth. It is not pragmatic but prophetic (Egan, 1999: 216)." Moreover, advocates of this type of nonviolence believe that there is no evil so great that it cannot be overcome by its power. In fact, their belief in nonviolence is so deep that it is often referred to as a "science" governed by "laws" that are considered on par with the unchanging laws of nature. As Gandhi once stated, "However much I may sympathize with and admire worthy motives, I am an uncompromising opponent of violent methods even to serve the noblest of causes (Sharp, 1979: 174)." This was because he always believed there to be a better, more humane option. His convictions would be tested with the outbreak of World War II, but were not found wanting, as we will see in the fourth chapter. The same unflinching

commitment cannot be said for proponents of pragmatic nonviolence, who do not necessarily share such faith.[10]

While there are atheists opposed to all war and committed to nonviolence in principle, such as Ralph DiGia – a well-known American pacifist that I recently had the opportunity to get to know while working at the War Resisters League (WRL), who was jailed during the Second World War as a "conscientious objector" and has worked at the WRL ever since – belief in principled nonviolence is often based on some religious faith. Moreover, principled nonviolence has been largely articulated from a religious perspective by two towering historical figures – Mohandas K. Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. – who are also its most prominent practitioners. Despite basing their beliefs on different religions – Hinduism and Christianity respectively - their thoughts concerning nonviolence are strikingly similar.

In this chapter I will only examine religious-based principled nonviolence. Through a look at the writings of King and Gandhi on the subject and several of the most well known analyses of their thoughts, I will 1) lay out however briefly the religious and philosophical ideas that underpin both Gandhi and King's rejection of violence, 2) explain what Gandhi and King thought nonviolence was and how they believed that it worked 3) go over the differences in methods, tactics, and strategy that do exist between pragmatic and principled nonviolence 4) and finally, with insight from the literature on conflict resolution and psychology, make the case that the principled form of nonviolence is ultimately more effective.

The Role of Religion

Gandhi and King's rejection of violence and promotion of an alternative was underpinned by several religious and philosophical ideas: a belief in God, that all life is sacred and interconnected, that no one is completely evil or beyond redemption, that one must distinguish between the evil the evil-doer, that no one is infallible, and that to reach a just end it is necessary to use just means. First, the nonviolence of both Gandhi and King

[10] This was made clear at a talk on nonviolent action that I attended in Washington, D.C. on March 15, 2004. During the Q&A session with Jack DuVall, one of the leading proponents of pragmatic nonviolence, he was asked about how nonviolence could be applied to a situation such as the genocide in Rwanda. To paraphrase, he replied that he did not believe nonviolence could be effective in every case and could support military action in such an instance.

was deeply rooted in their different religious faiths. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, the commitment to and faith in nonviolence for most proponents of principled nonviolence is based on their religious beliefs. The use of the language of ethics, moral reasoning, and references to religion, is in fact one of the primary distinguishing factors between pragmatic and principled nonviolence. Looking at nonviolence then through this lens of religion may be the best starting point to understand what it means to them.

Both Gandhi and King were known to be very prayerful people who relied fully on God for their strength and guidance. They each preached nonviolence and lived it out of their understanding that nonviolence was at the core of their respective faiths. Gandhi for example believed that having "a living faith in God" was an essential quality for a practitioner of nonviolence, "for He is his only rock (Gandhi, 2001: 88)." While, "A violent soldier's protection will be his arms, no matter how much he takes God's name… The first and last shield and buckler of the non-violent person will be his unwavering faith in God (Gandhi, 2001: 92)."

This faith in God was true not only for Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., who openly put God at the center of their movements, but also for principled nonviolent leaders from other faith traditions. For example, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was a Muslim disciple of Gandhi from the North-West Frontier Province (now a part of Pakistan), who in 1929 founded an "intensely Islamic" movement called the Khudai Khidmatgar, or "Servants of God (Bondurant, 1988: 135)." The Khudai Khidmatgar was essentially a "trained, drilled, uniformed and organized" nonviolent army that had, at its height in 1938, well over 100,000 members (Nagler, 2001: 247; Bondurant, 1988: 134). They endured "the most severe of all repressions in the Indian independence movement" without retaliating violently, and played a signal role in its eventual success (Bondurant, 1988: 138). This inspiring example should dispel the myth held by many that nonviolence is not compatible with Islam.

Man and Human Nature

Based on their religious teachings and their belief in God, proponents of principled nonviolence have developed a unique concept of man and understanding of human nature. They believe that all life is sacred and cosmically interconnected. This is more frequently referred to as the belief if the unity of all life. "Man is a child of God," King explains, "made in His image, and therefore must be treated as such (King, 1967: 72)." Gandhi stated

similarly that: "The knowledge of the omnipresence of God also means respect for the lives of even those who may be called opponents (Galtung, 1992: 183)."

This belief that God created all life and resides in the soul of every person by itself should exclude the use of violence, but this was far from satisfactory for King. He explained even further during a Christmas sermon why nonviolence is the only true road to peace. "It really boils down to this: that all life is interrelated. We are all caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied into a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly (King, 1967: 69)." It is true, he proclaims in *The Measure of a Man*, that: "I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you ought to be (King, 1959: 45-46)." Therefore, to take that argument to its logical conclusion, violence – even in self-defense – inflicted against anyone is damaging to everyone. This has often been expressed in the idea that the aggressor or victimizer is ultimately also a victim of his violence.

Gandhi and King also believed that no one is totally good or evil. As King explains, "the evil deed of the enemy-neighbor, the thing that hurts, never quite expresses all that he is…This simply means that there is some good in the worst of us and some evil in the best of us (King, 1963: 51)." Once we discover this, we will be able to "love our enemies by realizing that they are not totally bad and that they are not beyond the reach of God's redemptive love (King, 1963: 51)." This view is far from the norm and the near opposite of the traditional realist point of view that so dominates political thought today. That view holds a very negative, Machiavellian image of human nature. As nothing in their philosophy requires them to see the enemy in any other light, proponents of pragmatic nonviolence may even share this view. Gandhi on the other hand wrote that he was "an optimist" and had "an abiding faith in human nature (Gandhi, 2001: 230)." In contrast, he saw human nature as inherently good, and argued that, "it should be an article of faith…that there is none so fallen in this world but can be converted by love (Gandhi, 2001: 77)." The practitioner of nonviolence "must know that his suffering will melt the stoniest heart of the stoniest fanatic (Gandhi, 2001: 197)."

In following, an important belief for the practitioner of principled nonviolence is that the evil and the evil-doer are not one in the same. "We hate the sin," wrote St. Augustine, more than fifteen hundred years ago in defining a Christian, "but not the sinner (Nagler, 2001: 19)." This seemingly simple distinction has a profound effect on the way that

proponents of principled nonviolence view conflict. According to most nonviolence theorists, it leads inevitably to a much more structural approach to conflict.

Gandhi and King confronted these structural evils in segregation, discrimination, exploitation, and colonialism, while the "evil-doers" were largely the British and American people working within their systems to perpetuate those injustices. That is not to say that they were without fault, but it is believed that they were fulfilling their roles in unjust structures, sometimes perhaps without fully realizing the effects of their actions. The same could be said for any system of oppression. Therefore, Gandhi writes: "The essence of [the] non-violence technique is that it seeks to liquidate antagonisms but not antagonists themselves (Galtung, 1992: 197)."

Another obvious corollary of this concept of man that gave Gandhi and King even greater reason to abstain from the use of violence is the belief that every person is fallible, including themselves. Gandhi believed that it is a mere fact of reality that "so long as we are imprisoned in this mortal frame" it will be "impossible for us to realize perfect Truth (Gandhi, 2001: 40)." Reality is far too complex. This point is illustrated well in the *Udana* by the parable of the blind men and the elephant told by the Buddha. As the story goes, several men who were blind from birth were called upon to touch an elephant and tell the master what the animal was. Each man touched a different part of the elephant, therefore relaying to the master a different description of the creature when asked. The men eventually began to quarrel when their stories did not match, and they even came to blows over who was right. The moral of the story is that no matter how sure each man was or how hard he tried, they each were only able to grasp a part of the truth; and the same is true for all of us in life (Ireland, 2000). Gandhi inherently understood this parable and took it to heart. "While the perpetrator of violence assumes knowledge of the truth and makes a life-or-death judgment on that basis," Robert Burrowes points out that, to the contrary, Gandhi refrained from "the use of violence precisely because *no one is capable of knowing the absolute truth* (Burrowes, 1996: 107-108)." When this understanding of fallibility is combined with the reverence for life that I have described, nonviolence is the only option because through its use only the practitioner suffers if he is mistaken or if the cause is not just (Gandhi, 2001: 17).

Means & Ends

Another crucial belief that underpins principled nonviolence thought concerns what King calls "One of the great philosophical debates of history," the debate over means and

ends (King, 1967: 70). It has always been argued by some that the end is what truly matters, and that any means employed in pursuit of that noble goal can be justified. Therefore if the goal of a struggle is to develop a peaceful society, the use of violent, destructive means can be justified to get there.

This reasoning, Gandhi admits, has deluded many. However, he continues, "Your reasoning is the same as saying that we can get a rose through planting a noxious weed (Gandhi, 2001: 10)." Both Gandhi and King liken the means to a seed, and the end to a tree; and they believed that "there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree (Gandhi, 2001: 10)." To give a spiritual example, Gandhi writes that, "I am not likely to obtain the result flowing from the worship of God by laying myself prostrate before Satan (Gandhi, 2001: 10)." King gives his own succinct, complimentary explanation: "Destructive means cannot bring constructive ends, because the means represent the-ideal-in-the-making and the-end-in-progress. Immoral means cannot bring moral ends, for the ends are pre-existent in the means (King, 1963: 99)."

Similarly, Professor Johan Galtung, considered to be the founder of Peace Studies, contends that the means should be "goal-revealing (Galtung, 1992: 105)." For example, he notes that:

> Nobody in his right mind can want 'nuclear deterrence' as a goal for the good society, or secrecy, presided over by spy organizations and eroded by the spy organization of the other side, as a model of what future life should be like. The means are goal-concealing not goal-revealing (Galtung, 1992: 105).

So if peace is the goal, it can only be reached through peaceful means. If you want a society that truly respects life and sees it as sacred, you must start by living up to that ideal in the here and now. More than simply arguing that there is a unity between means and ends, Hannah Arendt goes even a step further. "Since the end of human action can never be reliably predicted," she argues, that logically, "the means used to achieve political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals (Arendt, 1970: 4)."

Christian Love

For the person who holds these different beliefs, violence in thought, word and deed is not only immoral and ineffective, but prohibited. Nonviolence is more however than the mere abstention from violence. Advocates of principled nonviolence add – or proponents of pragmatic nonviolence take out, depending on how one looks at it – a crucial element to the concept of nonviolence. That important factor is love. More than simply not responding to provocation with violence, the resister must do something far more difficult, he must return love for hatred. "Passive resistance," Leo Tolstoy wrote in 1910 shortly before his death in a letter to Gandhi, is "in reality nothing else than the teaching of love uncorrupted by false interpretations (Jack, 1956: 500)." That love that Tolstoy wrote of was greatly expounded on half a century later by Martin Luther King Jr. In a speech at the University of California at Berkeley in 1957, he pointed out that in the Greek language there are three words for love: *eros*, *philia*, and *agape*. *Eros* is understood as "romantic love," and *philia* he describes as "a sort of reciprocal love between personal friends (King, 1986: 31)." While both of these types of love are wonderful and important, the third type is of particular relevance to nonviolence. *Agape*, King explains:

> …is understanding, creative, redemptive good will for all men. Biblical theologians would say it is the love of God working in the minds of men. It is an overflowing love which seeks nothing in return. And when you come to love on this level you begin to love men not because they are likable, not because they do things that attract us, but because God loves them and here we love the person who does the evil deed while hating the deed that the person does. It is the type of love that stands at the center of the movement that we are trying to carry on in the Southland – *agape* (King, 1986:31-32).

King believed, as advocates of Christian nonviolence have throughout the centuries, that Jesus meant what he said when he commanded his followers in the Sermon on the Mount to love their enemies and to do good to those that harm them. "Far from being the pious injunction of a Utopian dreamer," King argues, "the command to love one's enemy is an absolute necessity for our survival. Love even for enemies is the key to the solution of the problems of our world. Jesus is not an impractical idealist: he is the practical realist (King,

1963: 49-50)." This message is seen as the ultimate challenge of the New Testament and absolutely central to his teachings. Indeed both King and Gandhi look to Jesus' example and his dying on the cross as the ultimate symbol of nonviolence, love and forgiveness. "With Jesus on the cross," King proclaims, "we must look lovingly at our oppressors and say, 'Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do (King, 1963: 46).'"

Satyagraha

Being one of the first people to advocate such a radical idea, Gandhi repeatedly had to explain nonviolence and clarify many of the misperceptions that people naturally have about it. One of the most common misunderstandings is that nonviolence is synonymous with cowardice, with "doing nothing," or is a weapon only of the weak that should be abandoned once recourse to violence becomes possible. Gandhi believed however that "Passive resistance, that is, soul-force, is matchless." "How, then," he asks, "can it be considered only a weapon of the weak? Physical force men are strangers to the courage that is requisite in a passive resister (Jack, 1956: 114)." In responding to such criticisms Gandhi realized – as all advocates of nonviolence have since – that the phrase that Tolstoy used, "passive resistance," or even the word nonviolence is misleading and often contributes to these misperceptions. The centrality of love to the Gandhian conception of nonviolence was also lost in those words. Gandhi, therefore, during his time in South Africa coined a new, more positive word for what he was doing: Satyagraha. As Gandhi explained the term:

> Truth (Satya) implies love and firmness (Agraha) engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force. I thus began to call the Indian movement "Satyagraha," that is to say, the Force which is born of Truth and Love or nonviolence, and gave up the use of "passive resistance (Bondurant, 1988: 8)."

This "holding on to Truth," as he often defined Satyagraha, guided Gandhi's entire life. In fact, Gandhi understood Truth to be far more than the common Western understanding of the term. Gandhi believed that, "Nothing is or exists in reality except Truth." Therefore, from his religious background, he concludes that, "Sat or Truth is perhaps the most important name of God (Gandhi, 2001: 38)." These three terms – truth, love, and God – were used interchangeably throughout his life.

Gandhi's belief in the power of this force was total, and through his "experiments with truth" over the course of his life this faith only grew. Indeed, similar to Schell's explanation of power in the previous chapter, Gandhi maintained that, "Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by fear of punishment, and the other by acts of love." The difference between the two is that, "Power based on acts of love is a thousand times more effective and permanent than the one derived from fear of punishment (Nagler, 2001: 68)."

Gandhi used a different word for this powerful "Universal" love: *Ahimsa*. *Ahimsa*, or the negation of *himsa*, is a Sanskrit word that literally translated means "the absence of desire, or intention to harm (Nagler, 2001: 59)." Gandhi asserts however that this word has a much deeper meaning. "Ahimsa really means that you may not offend anybody, you may not harbor an uncharitable thought even in connection with one who may consider himself to be your enemy," Gandhi said in February 1916 during an address to a YMCA in Madras. "If we resent a friend's action or the so-called enemy's action, we still fall short of this doctrine… If we harbor even this thought, we depart from this doctrine of ahimsa (Bondurant, 1988: 25-26)." He elaborated further on his interpretation in 1920 in *Young India*:

> I accept the interpretation of Ahimsa namely that it is not merely a negative state of harmlessness but it is a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evil-doer. But it does not mean helping the evil-doer to continue the wrong or tolerating it by passive acquiescence. On the contrary, love, the active state of Ahimsa, requires you to resist the wrong-doer by dissociating yourself from him even though it may offend him or injure him physically (Galtung, 1992: 186).

It is at this point that one can really begin to see the great similarities between *ahimsa* and *agape*, and what this love means when it is translated into action. Both require patience and the ability to forgive. Another crucial factor that is rarely mentioned in the literature on pragmatic nonviolence is that the practitioner must be willing to accept suffering, even to the point of death. Indeed, when this element is added to the equation, we come close to the definition of nonviolence from the principled perspective. "Satyagraha and its offshoots, non-cooperation and civil resistance, are nothing but new names for the law of suffering," Gandhi wrote in 1920 (Gandhi, 2001: 134). Moreover, he saw a close link between the

success of any movement and suffering, and believed that the power of suffering was directly related to its innocence and purity. Therefore, "Progress is to be measured by the amount of suffering undergone by the sufferer. The purer the suffering, the greater the progress. Hence did the sacrifice of Jesus suffice to free a sorrowing world (Gandhi, 2001: 113)." Similarly, and echoing closely Gandhi's words, King expressed the same point from his Christian faith:

> Somehow we must be able to stand up before our most bitter opponents and say: "We shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering. We shall meet your physical force with soul force. Do to us what you will, and we shall continue to love you… (King, 1967: 74).

King believed this to be the only way to stop the cycle of violence in any conflict, both on the personal and international levels. Someone at some point must not give in to the urge to return violence with violence but must counter hatred with love, expressed through self-suffering. And, the greater the evil, the greater the suffering will need to be. One is not called to suffer however for the sake of suffering. "Of course," King recognized, "no one wants to suffer and be hurt. But it is more important to get at the cause than to be safe (King, 1986: 129)." Suffering at times may be the only way to reach the opponent and "open the eyes of understanding," as appeals to logic and reason often fail "with those who have settled convictions" or in times of heated conflict (Gandhi, 2001: 191). Nonviolence, Gandhi repeatedly wrote, is an "appeal to the heart" that if made properly never fails (Galtung, 1992: 180).

A third component that was essential to Gandhi and King's conception of nonviolence was its desired effect. Suffering is to be accepted in an effort to reach out to the opponent's conscience and convert him into a friend. "We must not seek to defeat or humiliate the enemy but to win his friendship and understanding," King wrote (King, 1963: 51). Likewise for Gandhi, there was "no such thing as compulsion in the scheme of non-violence (Galtung, 1992: 199)." Indeed, conversion of the opponent was of such importance to Gandhi, that he called it the "acid test of nonviolence." To give an example from his own experience, Gandhi wrote: "That was my experience in South Africa, with General Smuts. He started with being my bitterest opponent and critic. Today he is my

warmest friend (Galtung, 1992: 209)." Gandhi's strict interpretation of coercion even excluded some forms of nonviolent action – such as forming a "living wall" of protestors to block roads or entrances to buildings that are being picketed – that are quite common today (Galtung, 1992: 113).

Conversion in the Gandhian sense of the word seems to occur in two different ways. Thomas Weber, a leading Gandhian theorist from Australia, concluded after looking at the vast literature on the subject that the process of conversion does happen, but in a more complex way than many of Gandhi's statements imply (Weber, 1993). He argues that self-suffering is much more likely to cause conversion indirectly "through the agencies of third parties" by moving public opinion or the opinion of those at a closer social distance "to the perpetrator of the suffering to the side of the sufferers (Weber, 1993: 282)." Through an analogy with a theory of classical physics that holds that, "for one thing to move another, there must be proximity in space and time, or there must be a field through which energy can be communicated," Galtung explains this concept of conversion:

> Black people suffering nonviolently, making their plight evident, touchable, speakable, would not be enough. The field does not connect blacks with white supremacists. Nonviolence has to be communicated from group to group until it reaches the nucleus of the structure challenged through civil disobedience. And the field through which it operates is not spatial distance but social distance. Via social proximity this age-old principle in physical theory can be translated into social dynamics. The field has to reach all the way for a message to arrive undistorted (Weber, 1993: 285).

Weber does note however that Gandhi did allude to this more nuanced understanding of conversion when he wrote that "the method of reaching the heart is to awaken public opinion. Public opinion, for which one cares, is a mightier force than that of gunpowder (Weber, 1993: 282)."

While Weber and others seem to discount the ability of self-suffering to convert an opponent through "an appeal to his heart" or an awakening of his conscience directly, this does happen as well. To give just one example, in his recent book *Is There No Other Way?* Professor Michael Nagler recounts a moving story of direct conversion:

> One of my friends, David Hartsough, who is white, was sitting in with a small group of civil-rights activists at a segregated lunch counter in Virginia in the early 'sixties. They had been sitting there without getting service for close to two days, and being harassed almost without letup by an increasingly angry crowd. As neither the sitters nor the proprietors backed down, tension increased. Suddenly David was jerked back off his stool and spun around by a man who hissed at him, "You got one minute to get out of here, n… lover, or I'm running this through your heart." David, who had had his eyes closed, repeating the twenty-third Psalm up on his stool, stopped staring at the huge bowie knife held at his chest and slowly looked back up into the man's face, to meet "the worst look of hate I have ever seen in my life." The thought that came to him was, "Well, at least I've got a minute," and he heard himself saying to the man, "Well, brother, you do what you feel you have to do; and I'm going to try to love you all the same." For a few seconds there seemed to be no reaction; then the hand on the knife started shaking. After a few more long seconds it dropped. The man turned and walked out of the lunchroom, surreptitiously wiping a tear from his cheek (Nagler, 2001: 90-91).

While most conversions are undoubtedly not as dramatic or rapid, this story demonstrates that the force of love and self-suffering can cause conversion directly as well as indirectly through third parties.

So this brings us to the question of goals. The aims of the practitioner of principled nonviolence vary greatly from those of the pragmatist. While acknowledging the possibility of conversion, as I showed in the second chapter, the general goal of the advocate of pragmatic nonviolence is to "win" or defeat the enemy without the use of physical violence. This goal varies little, if any, from the goal of violent combatants in war. Conversion, on the other hand, is one of the primary goals for principled nonviolence. This is, however, but one of its many aims, as Burrowes notes. "For Gandhi, success also implies the creation of a superior social structure, higher degrees of fearlessness and self-reliance on the part of both the satyagrahis and their opponents, and a greater degree of human unity at the level of social relationships (Burrowes, 1996: 109)." Undoubtedly, another desired goal would be for a greater realization of the Truth, and for both parties to be drawn closer to God through

the resolution of the conflict. In the pursuit of Truth, as Bondurant points out, a satyagrahi, or practitioner of satyagraha, should ideally allow the opponent every opportunity and invite him "to demonstrate the correctness of his (the opponent's) position and to dissuade him of his own position. He is at all times prepared to depart from his own position and to embrace the opponent's position should he be persuaded, by the opponent, of his error (Bondurant, 1988: 196)." Similarly, the ultimate goals of nonviolence that King often stated were reconciliation, redemption, "and the creation of a beloved community (King, 1986: 30-31)."

Grand Strategy

Having laid out the fundamental beliefs and essential elements (i.e. the search for truth, love, self-suffering, and conversion) of principled nonviolence, one must then ask the question: what do they look like when they are converted into practical action? What are the strategies and methods used in principled nonviolence? Perhaps the best way to understand the strategy of principled nonviolence is through a point-by-point comparison with the general strategy of pragmatic nonviolence that I outlined in the last chapter. I will also compare Sharp's strategy with the twelve-point "Strategic Framework of Nonviolent Defense" that Gandhian theorist Robert Burrowes has devised (Burrowes, 1996: 132-134). On the strategic level there are numerous similarities between the two schools of thought, and also a few important differences.

First, both agree that having a well-developed strategy is essential for success. Without using the same terminology, Gandhi would have agreed that the nonviolent resister should have a deep knowledge of the conflict situation before initiating the struggle, although he never formally developed a detailed "strategic estimate" similar to the one advocated by Sharp. Burrowes agrees, as he includes this as the first step in his framework. This was intuitively understood by Gandhi, and perhaps illustrated best when he took an entire year to travel around India upon returning to his homeland in 1915 after his many years in South Africa for this very purpose.

Second, I think Gandhi could agree that the formulation of a "grand strategy" for the entire conflict makes good sense. Indeed, Burrowes includes the development of the "strategic timeframe, stages, and campaigns of the defense" as a point in his framework. Although this may be desired, to my knowledge, in practice Gandhi and King did not do this. They did not plan a series of progressively more difficult and demanding campaigns at

one time and analyze all of the resources at their disposal in an effort to best maximize them. Rather they had a long-term goal that never left their sight; they largely focused on one campaign at a time and dealt with the crises as they arose. During the formulation of the "grand strategy," in principled nonviolence there is also of course no need to choose a "mechanism of change," as conversion was their only option.

Burrowes adds at a more basic level that at this stage the political purpose, the list of specific political demands, and the goals of the struggle should all be decided on. He also lists several other important strategic considerations that should be taken at this level that have not been a serious focus of Sharp's work. These decisions concern, 1) "the organizational framework, including the decision-making structure and process," 2) the leadership structure, 3) the nature of the communications systems, including how the nonviolent resisters will communicate internally, with the opponent, and with third parties, and 4) what the "key elements of the constructive program," or the positive work that always accompanied nonviolent resistance in Gandhi's eyes, will be (Burrowes, 1996: 133-134). Burrowes then argues in extensive detail that a decentralized and open organizational framework and leadership structure is generally the most effective.

Power: Part II

Third, it is often argued that one of primary differences between pragmatic and principled nonviolence is that one is "an approach based on a moral appeal to the opponent's conscience," while the other is "an approach based on undermining their [the opponent's] sources of power (Burrowes, 1996: 114)." As Burrowes astutely notes:

> In fact, there is *no* tension between these conceptions *in this particular sense* in the Gandhian scheme of nonviolence; they are both fundamental elements of it. The first element describes the approach to the opponent *as a person*. The second element describes the approach to the opponent's *role* in the structures of oppression (Burrowes, 1996: 114-115).

Hence, by seeing the wrong and the wrong-doer as separate, Burrowes is arguing that the conception of power that Sharp describes so well in his writings and the strategic focus of pragmatists on undermining the opponent's "pillars of support" is applicable in principled nonviolence as well. This differentiation if made properly is in keeping with the principled

belief that the nonviolent resister is required both to resist evil through noncooperation and civil disobedience while at the same time loving the opponent.

According to Burrowes, to do this one must break relations "at the level of social structure while reinforcing the deeper structure of human unity through greater interaction at the personal level (Burrowes, 1996: 108)." Noncooperation, therefore, Galtung contends, must not be:

> …an act directed against the actors who command the structure. Their suffering is not the intention. The struggle should be carried out in such a way that the structure is paralyzed… The purpose is to destroy a structure of exploitation, and to liberate both the exploited and the exploiter from it (Galtung, 1992: 73).

Gandhi did this time and time again throughout the struggle for *swaraj*, or self-rule, in India. He emphasized repeatedly that he was a friend of the British people and went out of his way to meet with British officials in South Africa and India while he was at the same time resisting them, or undermining their sources of power, through his many Satyagraha campaigns. During his trip to England for the Round Table Conference in 1931, Gandhi even made a point to visit the workers of Lancashire – a textile area that had recently hit hard times and seen massive unemployment, partially due to the Indian boycott of foreign cloth – to explain his actions and express his condolences for their plight (Jack, 1956: 266-271).[11]

Apart from incorporating this "pragmatic" view of power into principled nonviolence and their belief in the power of love described earlier, Gandhi and King had a fuller understanding of the power of nonviolence, seeing it coming from at least two other sources as well. The first source that Gandhi in particular focused on a great deal is explained well by Galtung and Burrowes. "Gandhi's approach to power," Galtung writes, "in one simple capsule was through power-over-oneself more than through building up countervailing types of power-over-others (Galtung, 1992: 64)." As Burrowes explains more fully:

---

[11] To Gandhi's surprise, there was a very warm welcome for him from the people of Lancashire and a great deal of understanding after he explained the desperate situation in India. As Gandhi's personal secretary, Mahadev Desai, recounted one person saying after meeting Gandhi: "I am one of the unemployed, but if I was in India, I would say the same thing that Mr. Gandhi is saying (Jack, 1956: 271)."

> Normative power (appeals to values or ideas) works because people are "empty," remunerative power (incentives and rewards) works because people are dependent, and punitive power (the threat or use of force) works because people are afraid. The way to minimize or eliminate the effectiveness of this power, Gandhi believes, is to build power-over-oneself through the development of personal identity, self-reliance, and fearlessness (Burrowes, 1996: 117).

"If one should suggest one word that might, perhaps, carry the burden of all three," Galtung contends that "*self-purification* might be the one, in Hindi *brahmacharya* (Galtung, 1992: 66)." It was out of this understanding of power coming through self-control that Gandhi recommended the taking of vows – such as Chastity, Non-possession, Control of the Palate, Bread-Labour, and Swadeshi (amongst others) – for the members living in his Satyagraha Ashram, or religious community, at Sabarmati in 1930 (Gandhi, 2001: 37). It is also for this reason that Gandhi saw the spinning wheel "as a daily sacrament and khaddar [homespun cloth] wear as a privilege and a duty (Gandhi, 2001: 130)." They were all signs or symbols of self-control and self-reliance.

Another source of nonviolent power that King and Gandhi believed in, and that practitioners of pragmatic nonviolence fail to stress, is the power of the idea. "When marches are carefully organized around well-defined issues," King wrote in an *Ebony* magazine article in 1966, "they represent the power which Victor Hugo phrased as the most powerful force in the world, 'an idea whose time has come.' Marching feet announce that time has come for a given idea (King, 1986: 132)." But more than simply having a sound idea, the cause must be "a just one, and the demonstration a righteous one," for change to be forthcoming (King, 1986: 132). To that equation Gandhi adds that where all these things exist, "there God is undoubtedly present with His blessings…[and] defeat is an impossibility (Gandhi, 2001: 236)." King warns however that, "if any of these conditions are not present, the power for change is missing also (King, 1986: 132)." To elaborate on the point, he gives a couple telling examples:

> A thousand people demonstrating for the right to use heroin would have little effect. By the same token, a group of ten thousand marching in anger against a police

> station and cussing out the chief of police will do very little to bring respect, dignity and unbiased law enforcement. Such a demonstration would only produce fear and bring about an addition of forces to the station and more oppressive methods by the police (King, 1986: 132).

The first example lacks a sound idea and a just cause, while the second would not be considered a "righteous" demonstration due to the poor behavior of the participants in the march.

Tactics and Methods

Fourth, Gandhi and King did believe in phasing campaigns, as the example from the civil rights movement in the last chapter illustrated. There was however often more of a focus on the structure and progressive steps of each individual nonviolent campaign. The structure of a Gandhian campaign has often been divided into three general stages: persuasion and public education, self-suffering, and noncooperation, which undoubtedly involves suffering as well (Bondurant, 1988: 11; Galtung, 1992: 73; Weber, 2001: 496). Gandhian theorist Joan Bondurant, through her thorough research came up with nine insightful, more specific steps that Gandhi seemed to follow throughout his many satyagraha campaigns: 1) *Negotiation and arbitration*, 2) *Preparation of the group for direct action* (this is also a point in Burrowes' strategic framework), 3) *Agitation*, which includes active propaganda, demonstrations, meetings, parades, etc., 4) *Issuing of an ultimatum*, 5) *Economic boycott and strikes*, 6) *Noncooperation*, such as boycotting public institutions, social boycotts, and the refusal to pay taxes, 7) *Civil Disobedience*, meaning the breaking of laws that are "either central to the grievance, or symbolic," 8) *Usurping of the functions of government*, and 9) the creation of *parallel government* (Bondurant, 1988: 40-41).

Fifth, at first glance, on the level of tactics and methods the casual observer would perhaps notice little difference between pragmatic and principled nonviolence. Indeed, almost all of the methods (i.e. demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc.) that I discussed in the second chapter as being used in pragmatic nonviolence are also employed by practitioners of principled nonviolence. However, most Gandhian scholars argue that saytagraha is far more than a technique or a set of tools that can be used for social and political change (Burrowes, 1996: 101; Galtung, 1992: 58).

On the surface, the most notable difference would be that Gandhi saw the sabotage advocated by some proponents of pragmatic nonviolence as "pure violence (Gandhi, 2001: 371)." But the difference for Gandhi on the level of methods was far deeper and subtler. He believed that the practitioner must believe in nonviolence with his whole being. "Non-violence to be a potent force must begin with the mind," he wrote. "Nonviolence of the mere body without the co-operation of the mind is non-violence of the weak or the cowardly, and has therefore no potency…(Gandhi, 2001: 284)." Moreover, the intention behind any act was of supreme importance, as Gandhi noted that "Non-cooperation in the sense used by me must be non-violent and, therefore, neither punitive nor vindictive nor based on malice, ill-will or hatred (Gandhi, 2001: 161)." Any act then that is based on these negative feelings or that is carried out with the wrong intent would be considered a form of violence. While not physically violent, these actions would be considered violence in thought and word. Gandhi therefore would not agree with the yelling of insults or the holding of hateful banners or signs during demonstrations that has become so commonplace today. Apart from being seen as immoral, if the goal is conversion these methods are unlikely to produce their desired effect.

On the tactical level there is one notable point on which Gandhi does not see eye to eye with King or with most other advocates of principled nonviolence, and that concerns the importance of numbers. King in his writings repeatedly notes the importance of the number of people involved in nonviolent action. "Nonviolence will be effective," he argued, "but not until it has achieved the massive dimensions, the disciplined planning, and the intense commitment of a sustained, direct-action movement of civil disobedience on the national scale (King, 1967: 59)." Galtung agrees, calling satyagraha an "instrument of power… provided sufficient numbers are engaged in it, thousands, millions (Galtung, 1992: 12)." From a Gandhian perspective, Michael Nagler argues that, "In acts of soul-force numbers can be handy, but they're never essential. 'In Satyagraha it is never the numbers that count,' Gandhi said. 'Strength of numbers is the delight of the timid. The valiant of spirit glory in fighting alone (Nagler, 2001: 84-85).'" Gene Sharp astutely notes in an older essay on Gandhi that:

> He frequently used small numbers of highly disciplined satyagrahis for very important missions. He rejected large numbers for their own sake for, when

undisciplined and unreliable, they weakened the movement. Under necessary standards and discipline, however, large numbers become 'irresistible (Sharp, 1979: 185).'

In summary, the main difference between the two schools of thought from my perspective is that advocates of pragmatic are stuck in the traditional way of looking at conflict and analyzing it. They are more focused on looking for the weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the opponent and trying to exploit those. Gandhi and King's nonviolence on the other hand is more focused on developing self-reliance, and making sure the motives are pure and that the cause is just. Through their belief in God, practitioners of principled nonviolence believe that when these things are given sufficient attention and when nonviolent means are employed the end will take care of itself.

Effectiveness

Now that we have explored these two different interpretations of nonviolence and looked at the different strategies and tactics used by each, the question is raised: In the field of practical action, which form of nonviolence is more effective at resisting evil and resolving conflict? A brief look at the recent literature from the fields of psychology and conflict resolution may help provide some answers to this important question. It would appear that the resolution of conflict or lack thereof is influenced by several factors, among them: the way that conflict is approached, the way the opponent is seen, and how the parties conduct themselves during a conflict.

To begin, how do the conflict resolution experts recommend that conflicts be approached to best facilitate resolution? The recent literature on the subject, especially the research of Dr. John Burton, would seem to suggest that most conflict is rooted in the denial of basic human needs. In following, the goal of conflict resolution is to search for a win-win solution in which the needs of all are met. This approach closely resembles that of Gandhi in all respects. Gandhi believed that conflict could be seen as both positive and beneficial, and he urged those in conflict to put themselves in their opponent's shoes in an effort to better understand their perspective and needs (Gandhi, 2001: 193-194; Galtung, 1992: 62, 97). Advocates of pragmatic nonviolence – holding a more traditional view of conflict – fail to take this approach for the same reason that advocates of violence do not: they seek to

defeat the opponent rather than trying to meet any of their legitimate needs or looking for a win-win solution.

Given this general approach, how then is it recommended that the opponent be perceived? A host of popular "self-help" negotiations manuals that were published in the late 1970s and early 1980s, including Fisher and Ury's hugely popular book *Getting to Yes*, all argue that in searching for win-win solutions it is important to make the distinction between the people and the problem (Weber, 2001: 501). Without the religious language, this is identical to Gandhi and King's approach – and absent from the pragmatic approach to nonviolence – as I explained earlier.

Finally, how does the literature recommend that the parties conduct themselves during the conflict? Morton Deutsch, one of the pioneers in the field of conflict resolution, sums up succinctly what characteristics are not conducive to conflict resolution:

> If one wants to create the conditions for a destructive process of conflict resolution, one would introduce into the conflict the typical characteristics and effects of a competitive process: poor communication; coercive tactics; suspicion; the perception of basic differences in values; challenges to the legitimacy of the parties and so forth (Weber, 2001: 499-500).

The extensive research on the subject, including studies done by Wilson & Bixenstine (1964) and Wiess-Wik (1983), would also suggest that using threats and embarrassing or taking advantage of the opponent does not lead to resolution of conflict but often to its escalation (Weber, 2001: 502). Robert Burrowes adds that recent conflict theories:

> …indicate that a negative approach to the opponent (including the use of verbal insults) is likely to induce role defensiveness and a threatening approach is likely to generate fear. In either case, these approaches are likely to consolidate a soldier's commitment to their military role (Burrowes, 1996: 221).

These conditions and behaviors that are not recommended for the resolution of conflict are all often present in cases where pragmatic nonviolence is used. Furthermore, it has been argued that the possible divisibility of means and ends in pragmatic nonviolence

allows for the use of certain tactics (i.e. deception, secrecy, and sabotage) that go against the prescriptions of conflict resolution experts (Burrowes, 1996: 113). Therefore, I agree with Burrowes, that: "Insofar as the pragmatic use of nonviolent action is inconsistent with recent conflict theory, it is an inappropriate component of any defense strategy (Burrowes, 1996: 157)."

The way to act in conflict that is advised in the conflict resolution literature is the near opposite of what is described above. According to the strategic theory developed in his study, Burrowes argues that:

> …personal contact with individual opponents should be positive and should involve reflective listening, including the acknowledgment of feelings, as well as educative elements. Given the inherent needs for recognition and self-respect, interactions that affirm the dignity and worth of the individual are most likely to induce soldiers to consider alternative information, to question their orders, and, ultimately, to challenge the legitimacy of their military role (Burrowes, 1996: 221).

Once again, Deutsch sums up well the characteristics of a healthy conflict resolution process by stating that, "if one wants to create the conditions for a constructive process of conflict resolution one would introduce into the conflict the typical effects of a cooperative process (Weber, 2001: 500)." These effects, all of which are recommended in Gandhi's writings, include, "good communication; the perception of similarity of beliefs and values; full acceptance of another's legitimacy; problem-centered negotiations; mutual trust and confidence; information sharing and so forth (Weber, 2001: 500)."

Although the word "nonviolence" does not appear in Lt. Col. Dave Grossman's book, in the previous chapter I argued that the findings of his psychological study strengthen the case for pragmatic nonviolence. It does so by removing two of the key motives that he describes for killing in war: self-defense and defense of one's comrades. It is my contention that principled nonviolence, with its focus on loving the enemy and self-suffering, is even better suited to psychologically disarm an opponent than its pragmatic counterpart. This I believe is because there is a power in love that, although impossible to prove or quantify, is sensed by the opponent and reaches his conscience and heart more directly than simple nonviolent action does. In summary, I believe – and evidence from the fields of psychology

and conflict resolution suggests – that principled nonviolence is for various reasons more effective than its pragmatic form. In the next chapter, to further make this point I will show – through case studies from the Second World War – how these two forms of nonviolence were employed against the Nazis and look at the results of each case.

CHAPTER IV
NONVIOLENCE IN WORLD WAR II

One subject that inevitably must be addressed by anyone advocating nonviolence as an alternative to war is World War II. Based on the erroneous belief that there were only two options available at the time – violence or passivity – the question is typically posed: What would you do about Hitler? Would you just let him take over the world? While this question is often times disingenuous, being asked in an effort to end the conversation rather than facilitate it, having a clear, well-thought out answer to this challenge supported by historical facts is still of significant importance for at least two reasons. First, the Second World War is widely considered to be a just war – possibly the last such war – and for that reason has been used for its tremendous propaganda value by the U.S. government to build public support for nearly every serious conflict that it has started or become involved in since. Seemingly every dictator is in some way comparable to Hitler and every tyrannical regime to that of the Third Reich.

Second, one of the primary reasons that the Second World War was so widely supported at the time and continues to have such a glowing image in the public mind today is that the Nazis have always been portrayed in the mainstream media and now in history books as the embodiment of evil, a force so diabolical and filled with hatred that nothing but violence had the ability to stop them. Even authors that would seem to generally be sympathetic to nonviolence often make an exception for this important case. For example, Hannah Arendt believed that, "If Gandhi's enormously powerful and successful strategy of nonviolent resistance had met with a different enemy – Stalin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, even prewar Japan, instead of England – the outcome would not have been decolonization but massacre and submission (Arendt, 1970: 53)."

The problems with these beliefs are many. First, making exceptions for Germany or any other ruthless enemy allows for the continued maintenance of a massive military apparatus because there will always be some looming threat that only violence can protect against. Second, those who use the example of the Second World War to support an argument for the necessity of armed force ignore the role that violence and war played in

giving rise to Hitler and the Third Reich, particularly World War I and the devastating effect that the Treaty of Versailles had on Germany. Moreover, jumping to the height of the conflict and asking "What would you do now?" overlooks the long rise of Nazi power and the numerous points where nonviolent intervention could possibly have had some effect prior to the war, but where little or nothing was done. In some cases powerful Western interests even supported the Nazis, both politically and financially. As political commentator Kevin Phillips notes: "Reports by the U.S. Commerce Department showed the U.S. investment in Germany increased by 48.5 percent between 1929 and 1940, while declining almost everywhere else in continental Europe (Phillips, 2004: 187)." What effect comprehensive international economic sanctions, similar to those that were applied and effective against the apartheid regime in South Africa or recommended by British military historian and strategist Sir Basil Liddell Hart against Germany in the mid-1930's, could have had on halting the Nazi war machine can never be known (Semelin, 1993: 182).

Third, as historian Howard Zinn writes, "It seems that once an initial judgment has been made that a war is just, there is a tendency to stop thinking, to assume then that everything done on behalf of victory is morally acceptable (Zinn, 1997: 259)." With massive militaries at their disposal violence was chosen by the world's most powerful governments to combat Hitler, and not surprisingly it escalated to heights that were before unknown. By the end of World War II, an estimated 52 million people lay dead, of which 48 percent were considered civilian noncombatants (Egan, 1999: 3). This does not count the millions that returned home physically or psychologically maimed, or the massive material and environmental destruction of the war. With the firebombing of Dresden, Tokyo and numerous other cities by American and British war planes, and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Gandhi's worry that if the Allies relied upon violence they would only defeat Hitler using what he called "counter Hitlerism," or "superior Hitlerism raised to nth degree," arguably came true (Jack, 1956: 337).

Some authors even see the Holocaust as a tragic step in the escalation of violence that would perhaps never have been politically feasible if it had not taken place within the context of a world war (Lyttle, 1988: 2). "Not only did waging war against Hitler fail to save the Jews," Zinn argues:

> … it may be that the war itself brought on the Final Solution of the genocide. This is not to remove responsibility from Hitler and the Nazis, but there is much evidence that Germany's anti-Semitic actions, cruel as they were, would not have turned to mass murder were it not for the psychotic distortions of war, acting on already distorted minds (Zinn, 1997: 247).

Princeton historian Arno Mayer shares this view, and supports it with the chronology "that not until Germany was at war was the Final Solution adopted (Zinn, 1997: 247)." The extermination programs, Bradford Lyttle points out, "were the most extensive and savage when Germany had gambled all in a war against Russia, faced an Allied demand for 'unconditional surrender,' was beginning to suffer major defeats on the battlefield, and was having her cities destroyed by air bombardment (Lyttle, 1988: 5)."

The fourth and last problem with this argument is that upon a closer examination of the war, Arendt's statement is over-simplistic and factually untrue. World War II and the Holocaust are far more complex than they are often made out to be. For example, it has rightly been pointed out in the literature that the Germans were far from the only people with bloody hands in the war. Not only did many countries not resist Nazi designs, but anti-Semitism was so strong throughout Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe, that locals in some cases assisted the Nazis in mass murder or even massacred Jews without German involvement (Gilbert, 2003: 2-3). There is no doubt that this broad acquiescence and support made the Holocaust possible. Moreover, it must be recognized that each country occupied by the Nazis had a unique experience. Concerning the Holocaust, there were major differences between the experiences of Poland and the Netherlands, where most Jews were killed, and Bulgaria and Denmark, where they were almost entirely saved.

Another point that shatters the simplistic and fallacious understanding of the Nazis that many have today has been well explained by psychologist Lt. Col. Dave Grossman. "We often think of Nazi atrocities in World War II as all having been committed by psychopaths or sadistic killers," he writes. This is one reason why it is widely believed that violence was the only option. However, he astutely notes that there is simply "a fortuitous shortage of such individuals in society (Grossman, 1995: 195)." If this is true, then we have to ask ourselves much more difficult questions. Why was the Nazi ideology so powerful, and what would have been the most effective way to confront them? Gandhi intuitively

understood that the German people were not all crazy or sick, and therefore recommended to the people of Czechoslovakia in 1938 that the Nazis be confronted with nonviolence. "Hitherto he [Hitler] and his likes have built upon their invariable experience that men yield to force. Unarmed men, women and children offering nonviolent resistance without any bitterness in them will be a novel experience for them," he argued. "Who can dare say it is not in their nature to respond to the higher and finer forces (Jack, 1956: 334)?"

This question may not be as naïve as many would first think. Despite having the largest population in Europe, Germany lacked the manpower necessary to both administer the territories that it occupied and carry out the "Final Solution." The Nazis therefore in many cases had to rely heavily on the collaboration of local authorities and populations to do their dirty work (Semelin, 1993: 11). From a pragmatic point of view, this dependence made resistance not only possible, but potentially very effective. The truth of this statement bore itself out during the conflict. Nonviolence was rarely tried against the Nazis, but as Professor Michael Nagler notes, "when it was, it scored a resounding victory (Nagler, 2001: 117)." In this chapter I will 1) look at what factors led to resistance during the Second World War 2) give a brief overview of several diverse cases of nonviolent resistance across Europe 3) look more in depth at the nonviolent resistance that happened in Denmark and the French village of Le Chambon, and 4) analyze these different cases from the perspective of pragmatic and principled nonviolence.

Civilian Resistance

Although not widely used, there were cases of nonviolent resistance in most, if not all, European countries during the Second World War. These examples may be able to give us some idea of how effective nonviolence could have been against the Nazis if it would have been planned, organized and used on a greater scale. In his fascinating book *Unarmed Against Hitler*, historian Jacques Semelin recounts numerous cases of what he refers to as "civilian resistance" across Europe that are largely unknown by the public.[12] The cases and types of resistance that he explores vary greatly from country to country, but include everything from:

[12] Semelin defines civilian resistance as "civil society's spontaneous process of struggle, by unarmed means, against the aggression of which it is victim." He argues that the term nonviolent resistance is inadequate because this form of resistance was "often chosen for lack of a better alternative," and did "not reject violence as a strategic principle (Semelin, 1993: 27, 30)." Perhaps unknowingly, Semelin here is only referring to principled nonviolence, because pragmatic nonviolence – as I described in the second chapter – does not have such qualifications.

> …strikes, demonstrations, church or court protests, civil disobedience movements against the compulsory labor service (Service de Travail Obligatoire), and various kinds of opposition carried out by educational, medical, cultural, and religious organizations. They also include… the most significant acts of aid and rescue of the Jews (Semelin, 1993: 1).

Perhaps more important for this study, Semelin asks the question why. Why did some people resist, while most acquiesced or collaborated? Why were there such great differences between the experiences of countries that were occupied by Germany? And concerning the Holocaust: "Why was the 'final solution' limited or even prevented in certain countries (Semelin, 1993: 130)?" To answer these important questions, Semelin provides a useful analysis of what factors facilitated or inhibited resistance during the war. The first influential factor that he singles out is legitimacy, or more specifically, what stance the government of the occupied country took towards legitimizing the occupier's power (Semelin, 1993: 54). A policy of noncooperation by the state, he argues is "the one that best activates civil society's potential to resist (Semelin, 1993: 60)." On the other hand, he writes:

> …when the legitimate government of a militarily conquered country chooses a policy of collaboration, this weakens civil society's resistance considerably. A possible resistance movement must then confront the power not only of the occupier but also of its own government (Semelin, 1993: 60).

This could be seen in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Vichy France, for example, where the negative effects of state collaboration with the Nazis were painfully clear in the slow speed that resistance built in those countries compared to others. This factor has such great influence on the development and strength of civilian resistance because of the deeply rooted desire within most people to obey authority that Milgram exposed so graphically through his famous experiment at Yale in the early 1960s (Semelin, 1993: 54).

Another factor that Semelin argues was extremely important to the development of civilian resistance was the degree of social cohesion – or "relative solidity of ties that bind individuals and groups to the heart of a given society" – within the occupied country

(Semelin, 1993: 64). The greater social cohesion that existed in any given society, the greater likelihood there was that a strong resistance movement would build. This can best be illustrated by looking at a few examples of successful nonviolent movements that arose in several occupied countries to protect certain institutions or professions from Nazi control.

In February 1942, in Norway, the Nazi-appointed Prime Minister Vidkun Quisling, "set out to establish the Corporative State on Mussolini's model (Sharp, 2005:136)." As a first step, he created a new compulsory teachers union that required fascist education. Showing their "remarkable group cohesion," the Norwegian teachers immediately reacted (Semelin, 1993: 70). According to Gene Sharp, between 8,000 and 10,000 out of Norway's 12,000 teachers sent letters to Quisling's government rejecting the new union and refusing to teach fascism (Sharp, 1973: 88). In an effort to intimidate the teachers into complying with their plans, they closed all schools in the country for a month, fired all teachers who would not join the union, and arrested and deported over 1,000 male teachers to jails, concentration camps, and forced labor camps north of the Arctic Circle (Sharp, 2005: 137-139). The teachers received wide public support and managed to hold strong despite repression. After almost a month, Josef Terboven, the Nazi commissar in Norway, decided that their plans were not worth the resentment that was growing among the population and they backed down. The Norwegian teachers returned home eight months after their arrest triumphant, and Quisling famously acknowledged defeat when he yelled at a school near Oslo, "You teachers have destroyed everything for me (Sharp, 2005:139-140)!" The nonviolent power of social cohesion was similarly demonstrated in Holland. During the war, Dutch doctors successfully resisted Nazi control of the medical association to which almost all of the country's doctors belonged. Facing nearly complete noncooperation and wide public support for the resistance, after two long years of struggle the Nazis were forced to abandon their plans to exclude Jewish doctors and apply National Socialism to the practice of medicine (Semelin, 1993: 70-71).[13]

Apart from the cohesion that is natural to certain groups, Semelin argues that external factors, such as aggression and the degree of repression exhibited by the opponent, are key factors that contribute to cohesion. Similar to Sharp's notion of "political jiu-jitsu," Semelin writes that: "By being too repressive, the invader creates unanimity against it

[13] For a more detailed explanation of this aspect of Dutch resistance, see Semelin's *Unarmed Against Hitler*, pg. 70-73.

(Semelin, 1993: 77)." This could be seen in Eastern Europe, where the Nazis were far more brutal than they were in Norway or Holland. In Poland, for example, the most important act of nonviolent resistance arguably took place in the realm of education as well. In an effort to destroy Polish culture and liquidate the Polish people, the Nazis went after the school system from the very beginning of the occupation. In November 1939 all of the professors at the prestigious University of Krakow were arrested, "and all academic institutions, except for primary schools and some technical schools, were closed (Semelin, 1993: 78)." Shortly thereafter, underground courses called *komplety* sprung up across the country for students in primary schools, high schools, and universities to allow for the continued teaching of Polish and history. During the war nearly 100,000 students from all school levels ended up taking these underground courses, leading one of the leaders of the Polish resistance to comment afterwards that: "Neither tracts, nor violence, nor sabotages were as productive as this…manifestation of the national consciousness (Semelin, 1993: 79-80)."

While Semelin attributes these cases of resistance in part to good group cohesion, he identifies another factor that contributed to nonviolent resistance: public opinion. This was expressed largely through three channels: "statements by moral authorities, especially churches; writings in the opposition press; and different demonstrations by the general public (strikes, marches, etc.) (Semelin, 1993: 95)." Semelin demonstrates, with considerable evidence, how strong public opinion not only led to resistance but also greatly impacted how the Nazis behaved. For example, he notes that a study of the diary of Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels reveals that he "feared reactions from the Catholic community… [and] thought that in order to win the war, they should not tangle with the church (Semelin, 1993: 101)." In fact, it was just such pressure from German religious leaders – especially the sermons of the Bishop of Munster, Clement August von Galen – that forced Hitler to end his extermination of Germany's mentally ill, known as the T4 program (Semelin, 1993: 99-103).

Similarly, in countries where there was little or no anti-Semitism, local populations did a far better job of thwarting Nazi plans to exterminate the Jews – even in several countries that were militarily allied with Germany during the war. In Finland, for example, when SS commander Heinrich Himmler demanded in 1942 that the Finnish government deport its 2,000 Jews, Finns immediately protested, including senior clergymen, and the

government flatly refused to comply (Gilbert, 2003: 255; Semelin, 1993: 139). When asked during a meeting, Finnish Prime Minister Rangell reportedly told Himmler that there was no "Jewish question" in Finland, and that the Jews were respected members of society. Not wanting to jeopardize Finnish support in the war against the Soviet Union, the Nazis dropped the issue, and virtually the entire Jewish population of Finland was saved (Yad Vashem: A).[14]

Bulgaria, in Southeastern Europe, with more than 48,000 well-integrated Jews, had a much larger Jewish population than many of the Scandinavian countries. Unlike most countries in the region, anti-Semitism was largely nonexistent. However, a new pro-German administration in Bulgaria filed the first anti-Semitic law aimed at excluding Jews in late 1940. Despite provoking protest from many Bulgarians, including the Orthodox Church, the measure was passed by the Bulgarian Parliament. Shortly thereafter, siding with Germany and Italy, Bulgaria joined the war and annexed Greek Macedonia and Thrace – two former provinces that it had lost during World War I.

During the summer of 1942, the administration created a new Jewish Affairs Commission – headed by anti-Semite Alexander Belev – that enacted more extensive anti-Jewish measures, including an order that required all Jews wear the Star of David. This move sparked renewed protest from the Bulgarian public that eventually pressured the government to back down. In an effort to exact greater compliance from Bulgaria, SS officer Theodor Dannecker was sent to Sofia by Adolf Eichmann during the winter 1943. He quickly negotiated the deportation of 20,000 Jews with Belev and the Bulgarian minister of internal affairs, Peter Gabrovsky (Levy, 2004; Semelin, 1993: 144). To begin, nearly 12,000 Jews from the Bulgarian-occupied Macedonia and Thrace were sent to holding camps where "they were kept for about a week before they were handed over to the Germans, who deported them to Treblinka (Yad Vashem: B)." According to Semelin, in an effort to not arouse Bulgarian opposition the decree ordering this operation was never published (Semelin, 1993: 144).

However, when the Bulgarian government began arresting Jews from Bulgaria proper to fill the order number of 20,000, Bulgarians were once again indignant. Two important leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan (Bishop) Stefan of Sofia

[14] I use the word virtually because the Finnish government did deport eight Jewish refugees to Germany. Only one survived the war (Gilbert, 2003: 255; Yad Vashem: A).

and Kiril of Plovdiv vigorously protested to the King and publicly urged their church to protect the Jews in their time of need (Gilbert, 2003: 247-248). Metropolitan Kiril, along with farmers in the northern part of the country, threatened to launch a campaign of civil disobedience and "lie down on the railway tracks to prevent passage of the deportation trains (Gilbert, 2003: 247-248; Semelin, 1993: 144)."

The vice-president of the Bulgarian Parliament Dimitur Peshev, upon learning of the order, gathered several members of Parliament and stormed into the office of Gabrovsky on March 10th demanding that the deportation be halted (Yad Vashem: C). According to Anna Levy, "they made it clear that they were not going to leave his office before their demands were satisfied (Levy, 2004)." Gabrovsky finally gave in and rescinded the order. Still not satisfied, on March 17th Peshev succeeded in collecting the signatures of 43 members of the Parliament in support of a forceful letter of protest that he drafted against the deportation of the Jews (Semelin, 1993: 144). These pressures coming from various sectors of the Bulgarian society together pushed the Bulgarian government to back down and release those Jews who had already been arrested (Gilbert, 2003: 249). While the nearly 50,000 Bulgarian Jews were persecuted during the war – as all Jewish males between the ages of 20 and 46 were drafted into forced labor camps inside the country – they virtually all survived (Yad Vashem: B).

At the same time that Bulgarians took their heroic nonviolent stand to protect their Jewish population from deportation and murder, another amazing story of nonviolence was unfolding in Germany itself. On February 27, 1943, as part of the "Final Roundup" SS soldiers and local Gestapo agents swept through the streets of Berlin arresting the remaining Jews in the city, many married to non-Jewish German women. They were promptly taken to a Jewish community building turned detention center on a central street called Rosenstrasse. Despite a law prohibiting public gatherings and the building's proximity to a major Gestapo headquarters just around the corner (on Burgstrasse), the wives of the Jews began to gather that evening outside of the building with personal items and food for their loved ones (Stoltzfus, 2005: 144-145).

The following day, the protest grew to over 600 women who "waited outside day and night, holding hands, singing songs, and chanting 'Let our husbands go!' (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 236)." Over the next few days the Nazis tried to break the protest in various ways – including firing warning shots over their heads, diverting all traffic, closing the nearby

train station, and even forcibly removing certain protestors – but the women continued to hold their ground (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 237; Stoltzfus, 2005: 145-146). As nonviolence typically does, the growing protest created a schism in the Reich Security Main Office over what action should be taken. On March 6th, a week after the protest began, the courageous women and their supporters prevailed. With Hitler's approval, Joseph Goebbels released the 1,700 to 2,000 Jewish prisoners held at Rosenstrasse – including 35 Jews who had already been sent to Auschwitz – in order "to eliminate the protest," according to his deputy in a postwar interview (Stoltzfus, 2005: 146-147; Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 237).

Denmark

One of the most remarkable cases of nonviolence during the Second World War occurred in Denmark. On April 9, 1940, the 900 uninterrupted years of freedom and independence that this small Scandinavian country, bordering Germany to the north, had enjoyed ended as the Nazis occupied the country overnight (Werner, 2002: 7). Unlike the people of Eastern Europe, who were seen as subhuman, the Germans saw the Scandinavians as racially closer to themselves. Therefore their goal was not to exterminate the Danish people, but to reeducate them and exploit their economy and natural resources as much as possible (Semelin, 1993: 7-8). The Third Reich consequently offered the Danish government an unusual ultimatum the night before the surprise invasion – submit and retain your territorial integrity and political independence, or face the might of the German military (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 208, 210). Concerned with survival and sparing the country a worse fate, the Danish government reluctantly agreed to a policy of cooperation.

For the first three years, Professor Emmy Werner writes, "occupied Denmark managed to maintain a degree of independence and remained an island of plenty and relative peace, unlike any other place in occupied Europe (Werner, 2002: 13)." At the beginning – while the population showed signs of nationalism and carried out minor acts of sabotage – the majority of Danes responded to the occupation by simply giving German soldiers the cold shoulder or ridiculing them (Werner, 2002: 11-12). However, as the occupation continued, German demands escalated. Under German pressure Denmark violated its constitution. The freedom of the press was curtailed, the Communist party banned, and three Communist members of parliament arrested. The Nazis also recruited about 8,000 Danish men of military age for the *Frikorps Denmark*, to fight alongside the Germans on the Eastern Front (Werner, 2002: 16).

Their increased demands however led to increased tension that sparked resistance and at times flared in public protest. Sometimes these acts were subtle. For example, in January 1941 when the Nazis coerced the Danish government into delivering eight torpedo boats to the German navy, the Danes effectively disarmed the boats by removing "their artillery pieces, torpedo tubes, and precious navigation equipment. The ships were thus delivered but in a state that rendered them unserviceable (Semelin, 1993: 38)." Other acts were more blatant, and hence more powerful. In November 1941, for example, when Danish foreign minister Erik Scavenius signed the Anti-Comintern pact – making Denmark a belligerent ally of Germany – students in Copenhagen took to the streets crying "Down with Scavenius." This effectively destroyed "the illusion that the policy of cooperation had any real public support," and pushed the Danes into making a decision: either "fight with them or against them (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 214-215)".

By early 1942 resistance had greatly increased, and was strengthened by a massive underground press (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 215-216). Hitler fearing revolt, called for a drastic change in the Third Reich's relations with Denmark that fall. He demanded 30,000 young Danes fight with the Germans and the ouster of the Danish government. The unpopular Scavenius was installed as the new prime minister, and Hitler sent SS General Dr. Werner Best to Denmark as the new German plenipotentiary, with orders to rule the country "with an iron fist (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 218)." This once again drove the Danes into the streets.

In an effort to demonstrate that there was still some degree of autonomy, Best allowed for Danish elections in March 1943 (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 218). The move backfired, as the coalition of democratic parties received almost all of the votes (94 percent) in the only election organized in occupied Europe (Semelin, 1993: 16). The results exposed the injustice of the occupation and boosted the strength of the resistance movement. The incidence of sabotage greatly increased and Danish workers began to strike. At the end of July a strike in the Odense shipyard quickly spread across the country. "Everyone, including fisherman, police, office workers, and civil servants, stopped work, closed their doors, and came together in the city center (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 220)." In response, "the Germans imposed a strict curfew, which was ignored. People crowded into the streets and refused to go back to work until the curfew was lifted. After five days the Germans relented (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 220)."

On August 28, not being able to control the strikes that at times turned violent, the Germans decided to once again give a harsh ultimatum to the Danish government. They had to proclaim a state of emergency, ban strikes, prohibit public meetings of more than five people and all private meetings, impose curfews, collect all weapons, turn over censorship to the Germans, and impose the death penalty for a number of actions (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 221). The ultimatum was promptly rejected, which in effect signaled the end of the policy of cooperation. The Danish government resigned and the Nazis – occupying key strategic points, arresting influential citizens, and cutting off telephone and mail service the following day – imposed martial law throughout the country (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 221).

During this crackdown Best finally decided to do something about Denmark's nearly 8,000 Jews. In a telegram sent to Berlin on September 8, 1943, he requested that the Nazis roundup all of the Jews in the country. Hitler gave Best approval, and a week later SS battalions and security officials began arriving in Copenhagen. Best shared these secret plans with a shipping attaché at the German embassy, Georg F. Duckwitz, who was a close confidant. Having many close Danish friends, including Jews, Duckwitz decided to do everything in his power to stop the deportation. On September 28, he learned that his efforts had not been successful when Best informed him that the roundup was planned for the night of October 1-2. Duckwitz immediately warned his friend Hans Hedtoft – the chairman of the Social Democratic Party and future prime minister of Denmark – and word began to spread quickly through the Jewish community (Werner, 2002: 39).

The following morning, Rabbi Melchior, the chief rabbi of Copenhagen, warned the congregation and organized a messenger service to tell all the Jews to go into hiding (Werner, 2002: 41; Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 223). Virtually all Danes took action, and organizations representing nearly every facet of society protested. Copenhagen University shut down for a week so that students could assist with the rescue efforts. "Many public institutions opened their doors to provide temporary refuge (Werner, 2002: 48)." Especially important were the hospitals, which alone "managed to save about two thousand Jews (Werner, 2002: 50)." Other Jews were offered keys to houses or apartments by complete strangers on the streets (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 223). As Leni Yahil, a professor of modern Jewish history at the University of Haifa put it, "Here was something Eichmann and his men weren't accustomed to." At great personal risk, the Jews in Denmark had been

hidden "behind a living wall raised by the Danish people in the space of one night (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 223)."

As the Germans stepped up the hunt for the Jews, the Danes realized that they would not be safe until they reached nearby neutral Sweden. A network involving thousands of Danes spontaneously developed to transport the Jews from homes in Copenhagen or coastal towns where they were hiding into fishing vessels to cross the Oresund Strait (Semelin, 1993: 153). "Although German soldiers continued to pursue Danish Jews for the next few months, their efforts were largely in vain as 7,220 Jews successfully escaped to Sweden (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 224)." Only 481 Jews were captured by the Nazis during the raids in October, and – thanks to continued Danish pressure – nearly 90 percent of those deported to Theresienstadt survived the war (Werner, 2002: 101). "The national solidarity" demonstrated by the Danish people, Ackerman and DuVall write, proved "that a well-organized resistance effort with tangible, realistic goals could subvert the power of the Third Reich (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 224).

This huge victory – the result of good social cohesion and the lack of anti-Semitism, according to Semelin – bolstered the Danish resistance (Semelin, 1993: 153-154). In 1944, the newly empowered resistance – led by a group called the Freedom Council – carried out further acts of sabotage, many aimed at factories that manufactured weapons or assisted the Nazi war machine. While not seriously weakening the Germans by most accounts, this violence provoked brutal reprisals (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 227).[15] In an effort to regain control of the situation, Best declared another state of emergency on June 25, and imposed a curfew from 8 P.M. to 5 A.M. In reaction, the next day 1200 workers at Burmeister & Wain, Denmark's largest shipyard, left work mid-day, arguing comically that the curfew did not give them time to tend their gardens after work. The strike quickly spread, and the country was soon paralyzed. This brought "the manufacture and transport of weapons and vehicles to the German army," to an abrupt halt (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 227). Best was infuriated, and cut off all gas, water, and electricity to the city. The strikes however only gained momentum, and after several days Best gave in to the demands

[15] A group of *Frikorps Denmark* veterans, called the *Schalburg Corps*, unleashed by the Nazis blew up part of the Royal Danish Porcelain Factory, wrecked the student union at Copenhagen University and burned the famous Tivoli Gardens in the heart of the capital (Werner, 2002: 127-128).

of the resistance.[16] The "People's Strike" was so successful that from that point on, "the Freedom Council de-emphasized sabotage and military measures in favor of nonviolent action (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 228)." The exchange between Nazi violence and Danish nonviolence continued through the fall – with the strikes growing ever larger and more organized – and into the spring, when the war finally came to an end.

Denmark was not perfect. The government did make several political concessions when it felt it had to, and the country exported food to Germany. However, "Copenhagen managed more or less to put off the delivery of military war material and proved itself uncompromising on the question of Jewish deportations (Semelin, 1993: 16)." In the end "Denmark emerged from the war in good condition," conclude Ackerman and Duvall.

> The Danes had withstood German occupation without undergoing many of the rigors experienced by other Europeans held down by the Nazis – a dividend of having resisted without violently tearing the society apart in the process... If the Nazis, the cruelest killing machine in the century's history, could be kept off balance by Danish schoolboys, amateur saboteurs, and underground clergymen, what other regime should be thought invulnerable to nonviolent resistance (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 231)?

Le Chambon

A small village of approximately 3,000 people, called Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, located in the mountains of south-central France was the site for perhaps the most amazing case of nonviolent resistance during World War II. The Huguenots, or French Protestants, that lived in Le Chambon were persecuted for over three centuries because of their beliefs at the hands of an intolerant French government and Catholic Church. This unique background allowed them to relate to the plight of the Jews in a way that many others throughout Europe could not. The Chambonnais predisposition to show compassion and resist was further reinforced by a dynamic young pastor from the Reformed Church of France, André Trocmé, who moved to the commune in 1934.

[16] "Best agreed to withdraw the hated Schalburg Corps from the city, end the curfew, and order German troops not to fire on Danish citizens. He also promised to lift the state of emergency after the strike ended" and resume the services that had been cut off (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000: 228).

Trocmé, and his co-pastor Edouard Theis, were both pacifists who strongly believed in the power of love and nonviolence. In the late 1930s from the pulpit they "preached resistance against the hatred, betrayal, and naked destruction that Nazi Germany stood for… [and] their sermons had another aspect: in attacking evil, we must cherish the preciousness of all human life (Hallie, 1979: 85)." To more firmly plant these ideas in the community, Trocmé and Theis founded the private school *L'École Nouvelle Cévenole* based "on the principles of nonviolence, conscientious objection, internationalism, fellowship, and peace (Henry, 2002: 74)." Hence, unlike any of the previous examples, the Chambonnais were learning about nonviolence and "had embraced it as a way of life years before" the outbreak of the conflict (McCarthy, 1990). It is no wonder then that Jewish refugees found a safe haven in the region, and particularly in this unique village, as the specter of Nazism began to rise throughout Europe.

The situation became more precarious for the Jews in France during the spring of 1940 when Germany invaded. After a short military confrontation, Marshal Philippe Pétain signed an armistice with Germany on June 22 that divided France into two parts: the Occupied Zone and the Unoccupied, or Free Zone. The Nazis would directly control the Occupied Zone, which included Paris and the entire Atlantic coast, and a French government headed by Pétain was created in the town of Vichy to govern the Unoccupied Zone (Hallie, 1979: 85-86). Le Chambon's location in Vichy France however did not mean that the Jews in the region were safe. In fact, successive Vichy governments collaborated more fully with the Third Reich than any other government in Europe, even going beyond German expectations in some cases (Semelin, 1993: 16-19). This complete submission could be seen from the very beginning, as Pétain agreed in the armistice to "arrest all the refugees that Hitler's government might ask for and deport them to Germany (Rochat & Modigliani, 1995)." According to Professor Patrick Henry, this created a "climate in which anti-Semitism and informing on Jews was not only acceptable but patriotic (Henry, 2002: 73)."

In an act of immediate defiance, the day after the armistice was signed Trocmé and Theis told their congregation at the Sunday service:

> Tremendous pressure will be put on us to submit passively to a totalitarian ideology. If they do not succeed in subjugating our souls, at least they will want to subjugate our bodies. The duty of Christians is to use the weapons of the Spirit to oppose the

> violence that they will try to put on our consciences. We appeal to all our brothers in Christ to refuse to cooperate with this violence…
>
> Loving, forgiving, and doing good to our adversaries is our duty. Yet, we must do this without giving up, and without being cowardly. We shall resist whenever our adversaries demand of us obedience contrary to the orders of the Gospel. We shall do so without fear, but also without pride and without hate (Trocmé, 2003: xii).

The citizens of Le Chambon heeded this exhortation to resist nonviolently. That fall, at *L'École Nouvelle Cévenole* Petain's picture was not hung on the wall, and the staff refused to sign an oath of unconditional loyalty to the Vichy government or enforce its order that all students salute the flag every morning (Hallie, 1979: 90-93). The Protestant temple also "disobeyed orders to ring the church bell in honor of the chief of state," during the summer of 1941 (Henry, 2002: 75). These symbolic acts of noncooperation, while important in building the villager's confidence and spirit of resistance, were soon overshadowed by far more dangerous and important work.

With the approval of his congregation, Trocmé decided to make Le Chambon a refuge for Jews and others fleeing the Nazis. Poor farmers and peasants throughout the area took Jews and their families into their homes and cared for them, sometimes for the entire duration of the occupation. "More than a dozen pensions, or boarding houses, toward the center of the village" were established, and "by the middle of the occupation financial aid from outside the village was supporting seven larger houses of refuge (Henry, 2002: 75; Trocmé, 2003: xi)."[17]

The secrecy of their rescue mission was soon brought into the open. The Vichy government knew of Le Chambon's "recalcitrant attitude" and the French Minister for Youth, Georges Lamirand, "accepted the challenge of trying to convert them to the New Social Order (Rochat & Modigliani, 1995)." During the summer of 1942, Minister Lamirand traveled to the small village for an official visit. Things however did not go as planned. At every event that he attended in Le Chambon he noticed the unique independence of the villagers and their distinct lack of enthusiasm for his visit. When the time came to deliver

[17] These houses were funded by the Quakers, American Congregationalists, Catholic groups, the World Council of Churches, and even national governments like those of Sweden and Switzerland (Hallie, 1979: 176).

the long speech that he had prepared, he offered instead only a few words (Hallie, 1979: 100-101). Immediately after Lamirand finished speaking, a group of students approached him with a document and asked for his acknowledgement on the spot. The letter protested the roundup of Jews in Paris the month before, mentioned that there were Jews in the village, and "informed him in unequivocal terms that they intended to protect persecuted people whenever and however they could (Trocmé, 2003: xiii)." Lamirand reportedly turned pale. He replied that their questions were not his affair and then hurried into his vehicle to leave. Trocmé was promptly castigated by another Vichy official and warned that they would soon return for the Jews that were hiding in the village. "We do not know what a Jew is," the pastor responded. "We know only men (Hallie, 1979: 103)."

Two weeks later Vichy police arrived in Le Chambon. However, an operation that Trocmé called the "disappearance of the Jews" was worked out after Lamirand's visit to hide the refugees at a moments notice in the thick woods around the village and in the nearby department of Ardèche (Hallie, 1979: 108). The plan worked, as the police made only two arrests after scouring the village and the surrounding area for three weeks.

Shortly thereafter, Germany broke the armistice and occupied Vichy France. This worsened the situation for Jews in the region, and brought everyone in much closer contact with the Nazis. German troops even set up a headquarters at the Hôtel du Lignon in Le Chambon. As part of this new assault, in February 1943, Trocmè, Theis and Darcissac, the director of Le Chambon's public school, were arrested and shipped to a French internment camp. Despite refusing to sign a declaration of obedience to Pétain, the three were surprisingly released after more than a month of incarceration (Rochat & Modigliani, 1995). "However, Trocmé and Theis were warned that their lives were in danger," writes Chris Moore, "so the two men went into hiding for the next 10 months but secretly stayed in contact with rescue efforts (Trocmé, 2003: xiii)."

Meanwhile, in Le Chambon the Nazis continued looking for Jews. Thanks to the dedication and organization of those involved in the rescue effort and to frequent anonymous phone calls that would tip the Chambonnais off to impending roundups, the Nazis only carried out one successful raid over the course of the occupation (Hallie, 1979:

114).[18] In the end, the compassion and love that the people of Le Chambon had for those in need saved an estimated 5,000 refugees, approximately 3,500 of whom were Jews.

Analysis

These various cases should make even the hardened realist question the belief that only violence was able to achieve victory against the Nazis. Clearly, as I have shown, unarmed people in Norway, Holland, Poland, Finland, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark and France were able to thwart at least part of Hitler's plans for their countries by protecting certain institutions from Nazi control and in some cases saving thousands of Jewish lives over the course of the war. Moreover they were able to accomplish these amazing feats with no prior planning, or knowledge of the theory and strategy of nonviolence.

How were these successes possible against one of the most ruthless military powers the world has ever seen? Were they flukes, or merely exceptions to the rule? I contend that they were not. They were possible because the Second World War was not as unique as it is often presented. It is true that it was the most violent, destructive war in human history. The Nazis were a military powerhouse and extremely brutal. However, they were neither omnipotent nor omnipresent. They suffered from the same weaknesses that every military power and occupier have faced throughout history. Their resources and manpower were finite which led them in many cases to rely on the people and the governments of the countries that they militarily defeated to carry out their plans and supply their war machine with resources. This dependency inevitably led them to be aware of and sensitive to public opinion, as is evident from these cases. (Indeed, where governments were recalcitrant, and where people made a concerted effort to protect the Jews living in their country, the Final Solution was often limited or avoided altogether.) And despite powerful brainwashing, Goebbel's propaganda and Hitler's forceful speeches could not completely extinguish the flame of the German soldier's conscience or humanity.

More importantly, these successes were possible because the Third Reich faced a power that Gandhi called, "superior to the force of arms (Jack, 1956: 114)." Nonviolence confounded the Nazis and created division in their leadership just as it has in so many other times and places. This was made clear by Basil Liddell Hart, who had the unique

[18] On June 29, 1943, the Gestapo raided two funded houses, the Crickets and the House of the Rocks. They arrested and deported eighteen students and Daniel Trocmé, André's second cousin who ran the houses (Henry, 2002: 79-80).

opportunity to interview German generals imprisoned in Great Britain after the war. After asking them about the different types of resistance they faced, he concluded that when confronted with nonviolence the Nazis had a distinct:

> ...inability to cope with it. They were experts in violence, and had been trained to deal with opponents who used that method. But the other forms of resistance baffled them... it was a relief to them when non-violent forms were mixed with guerrilla action, thus making it easier to combine drastic and suppressive action against both at the same time (Semelin, 1993: 120).

This enlightening statement only reaffirms the arguments for nonviolence that I presented in the previous two chapters. The Nazi generals were "relieved" when resistance turned violent because it allowed them to use violence more easily. Nonviolence effectively removed their prime justifications for using violence. Therefore, World War II was not an exception to the rule, as Arendt and many others argue. Rather, these rare instances where people did choose to confront the Nazis without violence are among the most powerful stories of nonviolence that exist.

While the people of Denmark and Le Chambon were largely successful in their use of nonviolence, there were important differences between these two cases and lessons that can be learned from each. First, both of these cases reveal that any resistance must pay due attention to pragmatic issues, such as securing funding for its activities. The Danish resistance needed to raise money to pay the fisherman for their numerous trips to Sweden, and the villagers of Le Chambon did not have the resources to take care of the thousands of refugees that flocked to their commune without outside help. Second, I believe that in at least one respect the strategy of principled nonviolence may be flawed, or overly rigid. Both of these cases are examples where at least some degree of secrecy was necessary for success. In Le Chambon, for example, while the people openly admitted to the officials that they were hiding Jews and the village as a whole agreed to take up their dangerous work together, they did make fake documents for Jews they were protecting and had to act clandestinely to save their lives. These tactics may not adhere to a strict interpretation of Gandhian nonviolence but seemed to be important to their rescue efforts and saved lives.

These two cases differ primarily in what type of nonviolence was employed. The Danes utilized pragmatic nonviolence in the sense that they had no knowledge prior to the war of this force, and no focus on the elements that are essential to principled nonviolence – such as love, self-suffering and conversion. As a result, they created unnecessary problems for themselves. Their behavior and a number of their actions were counterproductive according to the modern conflict resolution theory sited in the last chapter. For example, the Danes treatment of the German soldiers stationed in Denmark (i.e. ignoring, embarrassing and insulting them) was more likely to breed animosity than make them question their orders or create feelings of sympathy toward their plight. They also employed certain tactics – namely, the extensive use of sabotage – that provoked great repression while doing little to affect German capabilities. And finally, because of their lack of commitment to nonviolence, when tensions were at their peak, the Danish people were not able to maintain their nonviolent discipline. Violence for example erupted during the weeklong strike at the end of June 1944 that resulted in unnecessary Danish casualties (664 Danes were wounded and 87 killed) (Werner, 2002: 130).

However, when the actions of the Danes were motivated by love – as they largely were during their rescue of the Jews – even if that love was not directed at the enemy it could not help but affect the Nazis and even convert some. Incredible stories recounted by Werner of Nazis that caught Danes hiding Jews or transporting them across the Oresund but refused to arrest and deport them account to this fact (Werner, 2002: 74-75, 82). As Ebba Lund, a twenty year old rescuer who operated directly out of downtown Copenhagen admitted, "The German soldiers knew exactly what we were doing, but somehow they didn't stop us (Werner, 2002: 64-65)."

The people of Le Chambon, on the other hand, practiced principled nonviolence. They had a relatively deep knowledge of nonviolence, chose to use it deliberately (in large part because of their religious faith), and focused on its key elements. For example, the people of Le Chambon did not disrespect Vichy officials or the Nazis when they arrived in their village. In keeping with the prescriptions of conflict resolution experts, this proved to be beneficial. According to Trocmé's notes, this combined with the compassion of the Chambonnais for those in need "converted" Vichy police to helping them and their Jews (Hallie, 1979: 114). Even as the official policy was hardening, "*individuals* among the police and the bureaucrats of Vichy were more and more frequently resisting their orders to catch

or hurt people who had done no visible harm to anyone," notes Hallie. "They found themselves helping those who were trying to save these innocent, driven creatures. Caring was infectious (Hallie, 1979: 114)."

The Chambonnais' love continued to instinctively draw people to aid their rescue efforts even after the Nazis occupied the region. As I mentioned before, whether by someone in the German army or not, the village was repeatedly warned of impending raids. After the war, Trocmé was able to gain a fuller understanding of why his village had been spared. During a trip to Germany in the 1960s, Trocmé tracked down Major Max Schmehling, who was one of the heads of the German army stationed in the nearby village of Le Puy during the war, to ask him a couple questions. "You knew that Le Chambon was a nest of resistance; you knew we had Jews there, and the Maquis [the armed resistance] nearby," he said: "…why did you not send a punitive expedition to destroy the village in those last months? Surely you were doing this elsewhere in France, and in places near Le Chambon (Hallie, 1979: 245)."

Schmehling's reply was amazingly insightful. Colonel Metzger, head of a murderous SS unit called the Tartar Legion that was responsible for killing civilians and wiping out villages, he said, "kept insisting that we move in on Le Chambon. But I kept telling him to wait (Hallie, 1979: 245)." He recounted how he had been influenced by the testimony of Dr. Roger LeForestier, a doctor from Le Chambon who had been arrested, during his trial. He "was a Christian and…had explained to me very clearly why you were all disobeying our orders in Le Chambon. I believed that your doctor was sincere. I am a good Catholic, you understand, and I can grasp these things." He continued, "I told Metzger that this kind of resistance had nothing to do with violence, nothing to do with anything we could destroy with violence. With all my personal and military power I opposed sending his legion into Le Chambon (Hallie, 1979: 245)."

Would these same Nazis have been converted had they been confronted by violence or even some of the behavior condoned by pragmatic nonviolence? Such hypotheticals cannot be answered definitively, however I would argue that it is highly unlikely. These soldiers, even in this worst-case scenario, were still human beings. In all of these cases, it was only the power of love that was able to overcome the hatred and violence that had escalated to heights unseen and awaken the humanity that most thought ceased to exist in

the Nazis. In a very real sense then, principled nonviolence – while requiring great courage, conviction and sacrifice – is realistic and ultimately the most pragmatic way to resist.

CONCLUSION

Albert Einstein is said to have defined insanity as, "doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." This would seem to aptly describe humanity's stance towards violence and war. We have had faith that both will bring peace since the dawn of civilization. For more than two millennia, the Roman dictum, "If you want peace, prepare for war," has been our clarion call. This philosophy however has only led us further down the road of annihilation, as the 20th century was unquestioningly the bloodiest in human history. Clearly, violence and war have failed us time and time again, but somehow we seem to always expect different results. The time has now come for us to recognize, as General Douglas MacArthur did during his farewell speech before Congress in 1951, that the destructiveness of modern warfare, "on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes (MacArthur, 1951)."

Unfortunately we are still burdened by war because it remains a profitable enterprise for those in power, and the majority know of no other alternative for defending themselves. This ignorance, as was discussed in the first chapter, is intentionally perpetuated by the elite through their control of the main institutions that shape public opinion because it is a mandatory prerequisite for the maintenance of our ever-growing military-industrial complex. The real tragedy is that the dangerous militarism that has developed in the United Sates as a result of our ignorance and manufactured paranoia with defense squanders our real potential to create peace and security in the world. Nowhere have I seen this point better illustrated than in a chart created by the World Game Institute that was on display at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. This graph, supported by extensive research, illustrated how for roughly 30 percent of global military expenditure (remember, the United States spends approximately 50 percent of that total), various global programs for solving the major human need and environmental problems facing humanity – such as eliminating starvation and malnourishment, providing basic health care, shelter, and clean drinking water to all, eliminating illiteracy, removing landmines, and eliminating nuclear weapons, to name a few – could be fully funded (Gabel, 2001).

We will never see this massive shift in priorities and realize our true potential for

doing good in the world, however, as long as the general public believes that this money must be spent to maintain our safety. Therefore, as a first step, people must begin to learn that there are other effective, documented ways of stopping even the worst evil without becoming evil in the process. Gandhi and King thankfully articulated a different way to resist injustice and demonstrated its power on the world stage. As the 20th century drew to a close this newly discovered force came more to the fore. With little fanfare in the West, people around the globe utilized nonviolence and a new concept of power to break their chains of oppression and gain freedoms that they had long been denied. And amazingly, in most of these cases, the people involved chose nonviolence spontaneously and had little or no knowledge of the force they were employing.

We should "study war no more" as the old Negro spiritual goes, except as a sad relic of our barbaric past (Work, 1998: 202). By studying and educating our youth about nonviolence, rather than teaching them to dehumanize their enemy and kill, we would dramatically improve the effectiveness of this force. The principal proponents of nonviolence must become household names, and the theories, strategies, and cases of the success of nonviolence must be celebrated and taught to every person from the time he or she is a child. Only then will mankind create the culture of peace that we all desire and relegate war to the dustbin of history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACKERMAN, P. & DUVALL, J. (2000) *A Force More Powerful*, New York, St. Martin's Press.

---------- (Sept-Oct 2002) "With Weapons of the Will," *Sojourners Magazine*.

ACKERMAN, P. & KRUEGLER, C. (1994) *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, London, Praeger.

ARENDT, H. (1970) *On Violence*, New York, Harcourt Brace & Company.

BONDURANT, J.V. (1988) *The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

BOULDING, K.E. (1990) *Three Faces of Power*. London, Sage Publications.

BURROWES, R.J. (1996) *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach*, Albany, State University of New York Press.

CHOMSKY, N. (2002) *Understanding Power*, New York, The New Press.

CRIST, J.T. ET AL. (May 1, 2002) "Strategic Nonviolent Conflict," *United States Institute of Peace*.

DUVALL, J. (February 2004) "Liberation Without War," *Sojourners Magazine*, Vol.33 No.2.

---------- (March 15, 2004) "Harnessing Nonviolent Power in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," Panel Discussion, *Palestine Center*, Washington, D.C.

EGAN, E. (1999) *Peace Be With You: Justified Warfare or the Way of Nonviolence*, Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Books.

ERASMUS, D. (1974) *The Complaint of Peace*, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court.

FAHEY, J. & ARMSTRONG, R. (1992) *A Peace Reader*, New York, Paulist Press.

FAIR (March 18, 2003) "Action Alert: In Iraq Crisis, Networks are Megaphones for Official Views," *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting*, http://www.fair.org/activism/iraq-sources-networks.html

GABEL, M. (2001) "What the World Wants," World Game Institute, http://www.unesco.org/education/tlsf/theme_a/mod02/www.worldgame.org/wwwproject/index.shtml.

GALTUNG, J. (1992) *The Way is the Goal: Gandhi Today*, Ahmedabad (India), Gujarat Vidyapith Peace Research Center.

GANDHI, M. K. (1997) *Hind Swaraj*, New York, Cambridge University Press.

---------- (2001) *Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha)*, Mineola, Dover.

GILBERT, M. (2003) *The Righteous: The Unsung Heroes of the Holocaust*, New York, Henry Holt and Company.

GONSALVES, S. (July 19, 2005) "Winning hearts and minds," *Cape Cod Times*, http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0719-29.htm

GOODMAN, W. (November 5, 1991) "How Bad is War? Depends on the Images," *New York Times*, p. B3. http://www.cpcml.ca/tmld/D32122.htm

GREENSLADE, R. (February 17, 2003) "Their master's voice," *The Guardian*, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,897015,00.html

GRIMMETT, R. (August 26, 2004) "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1996-2003," *Congressional Research Service*, Library of Congress.

GROSSMAN, D. (1995) *On Killing: The Psychological Costs of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, New York, Little, Brown and Company.

HALLIE, P. (1979) *Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed: The Story of the Village of Le Chambon and How Goodness Happened There*, New York, HarperPerennial.

HELLMAN, C. (2004) "Last of the Big Time Spenders," *Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation*, http://64.177.207.201/static/budget/annual/fy05/world.htm

HENRY, P. (Winter 2002) "Banishing The Coercion of Despair: Le Chambon-sur-Lignon and the Holocaust Today," *SHOFAR: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2.

HERMAN, E. & CHOMSKY, N. (2002) *Manufacturing Consent*, New York, Pantheon Books.

HUTTON, W. (September 1-8, 2003) "The American Prosperity Myth," *The Nation*, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Economics/AmericanProsperityMyth.html.

IRELAND, J.D. (2000) Various Sectarians, *Udana*, VI. 4 http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/texts/khuddaka/udana/ud6-4b.html Last Viewed: September 29, 2005.

JACK, H.A. (1956) *The Gandhi Reader: A Sourcebook of His Life and Writings*, New York, Grove Press.

JOHNSON, C. (2004) *The Sorrows of Empire*, New York, Metropolitan Books.

KING, M.L. (1959) *The Measure of a Man*, Minneapolis, Fortress Press.

---------- (1963) *Strength to Love*, Philadelphia, Fortress Press.

---------- (1967) *The Trumpet of Conscience*, San Francisco, Harper & Row Publishers.

---------- (1986) *I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World*, San Francisco, HarperCollins

KREISLER, H. (April 8, 2002) "Through the Realist Lens: Conversation with John Mearsheimer," Institute of International Studies, *University of California at Berkeley*, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people2/Mearsheimer/mearsheimer-con0.html

LEVY, A. (May 7, 2004) "The little country that defied Hitler," *Jewish Independent*, http://www.jewishbulletin.ca/archives/May04/archives04May07-07.html

LOEWEN, J. W. (1995) *Lies My Teacher Told Me*, New York, Simon & Schuster.

LYTTLE, B. (November 10, 1988) "The Holocaust and World War," *Midwest Pacifist Commentator*, Vol. 3 No. 2.

MACARTHUR, D. (April 19, 1951) "Farewell Address to Congress," http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm.

MCCARTHY, C. (February 25, 1990) "Nonviolent Weapons of the Spirit," *The Washington Post*.

MCCHESNEY, R. & NICHOLS, J. (2002) *Our Media, Not Theirs*, New York, Seven Stories Press.

MOERK, E. L. & PINCUS, F. (January 2000) "How to Make Wars Acceptable," *Peace and Change*, Vol. 25 No. 1.

NADER, R. (2004) *The Good Fight*, New York, HarperCollins Publishers.

NAGLER, M. (2001) *Is There No Other Way?: The Search for a Nonviolent Future*, Berkeley, CA, Berkeley Hills Books.

NATIONAL PRIORITIES PROJECT, (2003) Chart entitled "Discretionary Spending Under the Proposed Bush Administration Budget for FY2003," http://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget/FY03/DiscretionaryChart.htm

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, (2003) Budget of the U.S. Government, http://usgovinfo.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/index.html

PARENTI, M. (1995) *Against Empire*, San Francisco, City Lights Books.

PHILLIPS, K. (2004) *American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush*, New York, Viking Penguin.

RAMPTON, S. & STAUBER, J. (2003) *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's*

War on Iraq, New York, Tarcher/Penguin.

RAPOPORT, A. (1992) *Peace. An Idea Whose Time Has Come*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press.

RENDALL, S. & HOLLAR, J. (July/August 2004) "Still Failing the 'Fair and Balanced' Test," *Extra!*, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting. http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1187

ROCHAT, F. & MODIGLIANI, A. (Fall 1995) "The ordinary quality of resistance: from Milgram's laboratory to the village of Le Chambon," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 51, No. 3.

SCHELL, J. (2003) *The Unconquerable World*, New York, Metropolitan Books.

SEELEY, R. (2001) "Nonviolence as Strategy and Commitment," in MCCARTHY, C. (ed.): *Alternatives to Violence*, Washington D.C., Center for Teaching Peace.

SEMELIN, J. (1993) *Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 1939-1943*, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger.

SHARP, G. (1973) *The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Power and Struggle*, Boston, Porter Sargent Publisher.

---------- (1979) *Gandhi as a Political Strategist*, Boston, Porter Sargent Publishers.

---------- (1993) *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, Boston, The Albert Einstein Institution.

---------- (2005) *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, Boston, Porter Sargent Publishers.

SKÖNS, E. ET AL. (2004) *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yb04/ch10.html.

SMITH, D. (October 7, 2003) "Truth in Spending," *FPIF Policy Report*, Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/papers/spending2003_body.html

STOLTZFUS, N. (2005) "Saving Jewish Husbands in Berlin – 1943," in SHARP, G. (ed.): *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, Boston, Porter Sargent Publishers.

TROCMÉ, A. (2003) *Jesus and the Nonviolent Revolution*, Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Books.

TRUTH FORCE TRAINING CENTER, Bronx, NY, http://www.truthforcenyc.org/about/staff.shtml

WEBER, T. (July 1993) "'The Marchers Simply Walked Forward Until Struck Down': Nonviolent Suffering and Conversion," *Peace & Change*, Vol. 18, No. 3.

---------- (July 2001) "Gandhian Philosophy, Conflict Resolution Theory and Practical Approaches to Negotiation," *Peace & Change*, Vol. 38, No. 4.

WERNER, E. (2002) *A Conspiracy of Decency: The Rescue of the Danish Jews During World War II*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press.

WORK, J.W. (1998) *American Negro Songs: 230 Folk Songs and Spirituals, Religious and Secular*, Dover.

YAD VASHEM, A: "Finland," *SHOAH Resource Center*, Jerusalem, Israel, http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205852.pdf

B: "Bulgaria," *SHOAH Resource Center*, Jerusalem, Israel, http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%206092.pdf

C: "The Righteous Among The Nations: Bulgaria," http://www1.yadvashem.org/righteous/bycountry/bulgaria.html

YEUNG, B. (March 26, 2003) "Unarmed Soldiers: Building a peace army, one person at a time," *SF Weekly*, http://www.sfweekly.com/issues/2003-03-26/feature.html/1/index.html.

ZINN, H. (1997) *The Zinn Reader*, New York, Seven Stories Press.